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ABSTRACT 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1969-1980): 
IDEAS, NORMS AND THE STATE  
 
Demirtaş, Melih 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Hasan Ali Karasar, Ph.D.  
 
July 2008 
 
 
This thesis attempts to shed light on the difficulties of defending the international 
norms of the idea of human rights against the dominance of the state and its interests, 
which are explained essentially by the rationalists and the political realists in 
domestic and international affairs, by focusing the clash between the Soviet state and 
the Soviet (Russian) dissidents throughout the détente period (1969-1980). The 
history of prominent dissident activities in Soviet Russia began during the de-
Stalinization period under the Khrushchev administration (1956-1964). However, the 
human rights movement in the Soviet Union was affected to a great extent by the 
international environment in 1970s during which time norms became more 
significant in bilateral relations, and human rights-idea began to constitute the source 
of a normative challenge to pure rationalist/realist explanations based on power, self-
interest and anarchy. In this regard, the primary purpose of adopting a constructivist 
perspective regarding the internationalization of human rights is to analyze the 
dissidence activities nurtured by the international norms and principles of human 
rights in Soviet Russia. Thus, the impacts of oppositions and responses supported by 
domestic and international factors within the state can be understood congruent with 
the policy changes, continuities, and stalemates. While the Soviet state’s fundamental 
response to these activities is interpreted as an amalgam of ideology, a priori 
principles and state-interests, the main argument of this thesis does not challenge the 
explanatory power of the rationalist/realist line in comprehending the dominance of 
the state over the dissidents and human rights defenders. 
 
Keywords: Human rights, Dissident, Dissidence, Soviet Russia, State, Détente, 
Political Realism 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SOVYET RUSYA’DA İNSAN HAKLARI HAREKETİ (1969-1980): 
FİKİRLER, NORMLAR VE DEVLET 
 
Demirtaş, Melih 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
Temmuz 2008 
 
 
Bu tez, detant / yumuşama süreci (1969-1980) boyunca, Sovyet devleti ve Sovyet 
(Rus) muhalifleri arasındaki uyuşmazlığı vurgulamak suretiyle, esas olarak iç ve 
uluslararası olaylarda rasyonalistler ve politik realistler tarafından açıklanan devlet 
ve çıkarlarının baskınlığı karşısında, insan hakları fikrine ait uluslararası normları 
savunmanın zorluklarına ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır. Sovyet Rusya’da önemli 
muhalif hareketler Kruşçev yönetimi döneminde (1956-1964) başladı. Fakat 
Sovyetler Birliği’nde insan hakları hareketi büyük ölçüde, normların ikili ilişkilerde 
daha önemli olduğu ve insan hakları fikrinin güç, hususi menfaatler ve anarşi üzerine 
kurulu rasyonel/realist açıklamalara karşı normatif bir itiraz kaynağını teşkil ettiği 
1970’lerin uluslararası ortamından etkilendi. Bu bağlamda, insan haklarının 
uluslararasılaşması ile ilintili konstrüktivist bir bakış açısını benimsemenin birincil 
amacı Sovyet Rusya’da insan haklarının uluslararası norm ve prensiplerince beslenen 
muhalif hareketleri incelemektir. Böylelikle devlet içerisinde içsel ve uluslararası 
etkenler tarafından desteklenen muhalefet ve tepkiler, politika değişimleri, 
devamlılıkları ve açmazları ile uyumlu olarak anlaşılabilecektir. Sovyet devletinin bu 
eylemlere olan temel tepkisindeki dayanak noktası, ideoloji, önceden tanımlı 
prensipler ve devlet çıkarlarının bir birleşimi olarak yorumlanırken, bu tezin ana 
argümanı rasyonel/realist çizginin muhalifler ve insan hakları savunucuları 
üzerindeki devlet üstünlüğünü anlayabilmedeki açıklayıcı gücüne karşı 
çıkmayacaktır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Hakları, Muhalif, Fikir Ayrılığı (Muhalefet), Sovyet 
Rusya, Devlet, Detant (Yumuşama), Politik Realizm 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Theory, Area of Focus, and the Argument 
 
Starting from the era of détente of the late 1960s “the tripartite subdivision of 
international relations into security, economic issues, and human rights”1 became 
clear. As Toscano formulated the problem, “the unsatisfactory Soviet answer to the 
human rights question has been one of the components of a wider loss of ideological 
hegemony and appeal of the Soviet system outside the borders of the USSR.”2 
Hence, the issue of human rights turned out to be perhaps the most significant 
“Achilles heels” in Soviet domestic and foreign policy.3 
This thesis’ aim is in line with going back to the period before the process in 
which “Achilles heels” or defects in the Soviet state obliged decision makers like 
Gorbachev4 to make reforms and rehabilitations. In this respect, the main issue 
addressed by this project is to understand the Soviet attitude vis a vis the rise of ideas 
and norms of human rights in the détente era. Consequently, this thesis examines the 
                                                 
1
 Roberto Toscano, Soviet Human Rights Policy and Perestroika (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for 
International Affairs/Harvard University, 1989), p.21. 
2
 Toscano, Soviet Human Rights Policy and Perestroika, p.22. 
3
 Toscano, Soviet Human Rights Policy and Perestroika, p.24. 
4
 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
from 1985 until the dissolution in 1991. 
 2 
Soviet state’s response to the domestic dissidence5 movement based on the 
international human rights norms. 
One element of the argument of this thesis concerns ideas, norms and possible 
effects of the interaction between internal and international politics in 
comprehending the impact of human rights on states’ agendas. However, I do not 
deny the realist premise that state supremacy enjoys a privileged explanatory status. 
Appreciating this supremacy of the state is crucial to grasp the interest-driven, 
rationalist accounts of states and to understand the temporary character of challenges 
to the state’s authority as occurred in Soviet Russia6 between 1969-1980.  
 Furthermore, I argue that the political evolution of human rights initiated 
after the Second World War has continued to take new forms following the 
developments observed in both domestic and international policy, for example 
improvements in international human rights law during the Cold War, or the 
Helsinki-process (1972-1975) that led to a considerable attention to human rights 
during the second half of the era of détente.  
On the other hand, I will underline the reasons for the Soviet state’s harsh 
response to dissidence based on human rights and suggest that in addition to decision 
makers’ ideologically-driven interests, the structure of an international environment 
dominated by the rationalist/realist calculations helps to explain the failure of the 
                                                 
5
 The concept of dissidence (or dissent) is defined by Barghoorn in line with a “broad range of 
articulated negative attitudes in regarding political matters.” The target of this negative side can be the 
“political authority,” “or at certain types of political systems, regimes, and structures”, in addition to 
“political norms and rules, principles, doctrines, and ideologies.” However, while the aim of 
dissidents can begin with a negative way of criticism, the fundamental aims might be positive by 
“correcting mistakes” and providing more space for different ways of thinking. Frederick C. 
Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR (New York, London: The Free Press, 
1976), p. 6. 
6
 Soviet Russia or Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) is intentionally chosen in 
order to limit the subject within the borders of a specific territory. Thus, although due to the 
characteristic of the course of events analyzed in this work, it is not possible to exclude completely the 
other parts of the Soviet Union, like the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian or Armenian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, or other states included in the Warsaw Pact (in the Communist Bloc), like the Central and 
Eastern European countries, Soviet Russia or RSFSR will be at the centre of the historical case study 
of this work.   
 3 
ideational perspective linked with Soviet human rights groups despite the existence 
of a priori and generally accepted international norms and principles.  
As a domestic case study will show, the political and social structure of the 
Soviet Union may be defined as a “state-controlled” system in which “domestic 
structures encompass highly centralized political institutions with strong executive 
governments and a rather weak level of societal organization.”7 In a highly 
centralized and state-controlled mechanism or Party-controlled system as in the case 
of the Soviet Union, transnational initiatives are constrained, and “access to the 
political system” is seen highly dependent on the state authority.8  
Accordingly, my argument is consistent with a “statist” approach through 
which the state’s presence and dominance in the international realm is understood to 
have a like effect upon domestic politics and policies. Put simply, the argument 
precedes in line with Krasner’s notion that “both statism and realism are analytic 
traditions that fall within a larger Machiavellian or power politics paradigm that 
takes actors rather than institutional structures as the units of analysis and which 
understand politics as a struggle over politics, as a struggle over distribution of 
resources or even over life and death.”9  
Considering both the realist and statist factors, my conclusions contrast with 
pluralist or highly value-based constructive explanations that are more appropriate 
for the period toward the end of the 1980s in which Gorbachev’s key administrative 
decisions and his escalation of reform-movements congruent with the rise of 
                                                 
7
 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Introduction,” in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State 
Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations, Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 23. 
8
 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Introduction,” p. 25; Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, 
Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the USSR and Russia,” in Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations, Thomas Risse-
Kappen (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 150-151.  
9
 Stephen Krasner, “Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Relations,” in Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations, 
Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995),  p. 259.  
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transnational forces in the Soviet Union became the main topic for discussion.10 
However, my research has led me to conclude that Brezhnev11 era and the 
suppression of domestic forces, including any types of dissidence based on a rhetoric 
of human rights, may support the rationalist account of the state-elites and the 
necessity of using power in internal politics in line with interest-driven competition 
at the level of international relations. In this respect, this thesis is unique on account 
of the fact that certain basic historical events are re-evaluated within a critical and 
theoretical perspective.  
 
1.2. Methodology and Structure 
In this work, I have adopted a qualitative research method and examine the case 
study of Soviet Russia in the détente era (1969-1980). In this study, both theoretical 
considerations and a historical narrative play a role. In terms of theory, constructivist 
claims on the ideational process of human rights will be investigated in order to 
understand the internationalization process of the domestic norms and principles of 
human rights. On the other hand, in order to understand the response of the Soviet 
state’s repressive regime, some basic principles of political realism in international 
affairs will be adopted with respect to the impact of rationalism and statism on 
domestic affairs.  
While maintaining the historical study, both primary and secondary sources 
will be benefited. Memoirs and autobiographies of statesmen, bureaucrats and 
                                                 
10
 Considering the Gorbachev-era within the second half of 1980s, similar to Grunberg and Kappen, it 
can be argued that “[i]f the end of the Cold War tells us anything, it is that values, norms, and ideas 
matter in international relations, that they have tremendous potential for bringing about fundamental 
change in world politics.” See, Isabelle Grunberg and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “A Time of Reckoning? 
Theories of International Relations and the End of the Cold War,” in The End of the Cold War: 
Evaluating Theories of International Relations, Pierre Allan, Kjell Goldmann (eds.) (Hague, Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 146.  
11
 Nikita Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between the 
years 1964-1982. 
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prominent dissidents, examples of samizdat literature, newspaper articles, and 
international legal documents are used to enrich the scope and variety of sources 
treated in this work.   
Although the concept of “dissent” or “dissidence” in the Soviet Union 
encompassed a wide realm of non-state activities, including religious, ethnic, and 
nationalistic movements, the focal points of the historical case study are the groups 
and personalities who pioneered a non-violent defense-initiative based on 
international principles and norms of human rights against the authoritarian measures 
of the state. On account of the following admonition by the noted dissident Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva I adopt a Moscow-centered approach to the history of the period: “The 
[human rights] movement was born in Moscow, and it was here that the circle of 
activists and sympathizers of the movement was the widest. It is primarily through 
Moscow that contact with the West is made.”12  
This thesis is divided into five chapters. After the introduction, I present 
theoretical study on the main issue of human rights in international affairs. How can 
we understand the internationalization of human rights?  I argue for a constructivist 
response by explaining the role of ideas and principles of human rights which have 
been rapidly transformed into binding norms of international law during the second 
half of the twentieth century. However, in the next part of the second chapter, I 
consider the rationalist accounts of statesmen and the realist position in the 
international affairs as a significant barrier to international norms of human rights: 
What are the main motives of realists in rejecting and underestimating human rights 
in international relations? 
                                                 
12
 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and 
Human Rights (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. 286.  
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In the third chapter, I examine the détente era in a historicizing perspective. In 
this period, I briefly summarize the relations between the major powers, the United 
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or the Soviet Union. 
Regarding the internationalization of human rights, I treat the Helsinki Process 
(1972-1975) and the Final Act (1975) as the issue in the era of détente. I explain both 
the U.S. and Soviet foreign policies regarding internationally recognized norms of 
human rights, and I link both ideological and rational policy choices with the 
theoretical perspective provided in the previous chapter. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to a domestic case study on the clash between 
the Soviet state and the Soviet (Russian) dissidents throughout the détente era. 
Starting from the de-Stalinization period with Nikita Khrushchev,13 a chronological 
order will be followed to understand the rise of the state-repression. I study the 
techniques, associations, the ideological-formation of various dissident personalities 
with a special emphasis on the common respect to the international human rights 
norms. Consequently, I trace the links between these dissidents and the West, 
especially during the Helsinki Process, in order to grasp the dynamics of this 
relationship at both the international and domestic levels. 
In the concluding chapter, I recapitulate the reasons for the difficulty in 
defending a constructive human rights based approach in the case of Soviet Russia 
during the détente era. The weaknesses and divergences within the dissidence 
movement are discussed, and finally the power of the rationalist statism and political 
realism is evaluated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
between the years 1953-1964.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
HUMAN RIGHTS, STATES, POLITICAL REALISM 
 
 
 
 
Any assessment of the dominate idea of human rights 
must include an analysis of interests, power and 
hegemony. Unless politics and power are added to the 
debate, our understanding of human rights in the past and 
future eras remains incomplete.14 
 
2.1. Introduction  
As a concept, “human rights” is still a hot topic of discussions of philosophers, 
political scientists, lawyers, and scholars from various other disciplines. The essence 
of such discussions can be different in diverse contexts: Should we understand these 
rights as mere political/civil rights? Do these rights include only individuals, or is 
there a base for collective rights? Should we treat these rights as a construction of the 
Western world, or as universal values? Is there a possible mechanism of enforcement 
for human rights over sovereign nation-states? Whatever dimension we take, it is 
visible that although the political and legal sides of “human rights” have led to the 
great achievements in the international (mainly via the efforts of the United Nations) 
and regional contexts (e.g. the activities of the Council of Europe,) still the 
                                                 
14
 Tony Evans, “Introduction: Power, Hegemony and the Universalization of Human Rights,” in 
Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal, Tony Evans (ed.) (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2.  
 8 
assessment of this notion as a “contested concept” is a part of the common attitude in 
the political ground.15 
Consequently, the adoption of human rights in the field of political affairs, 
and especially in the field of international politics, has led to immense discussions 
among scholars and politicians. For some, the introduction of human rights to 
international relations means that two traditional rival theories, realism and idealism 
(or liberalism), have had a new collision between one another. Although liberalism is 
seen as “malleable and evolving notion” in international relations, it has been 
supported by the principles of international law and human rights much more than 
realism.16 However, on the other side, we can see the dominant realist arguments 
which have prepared an appropriate environment for state’s interest and their seeking 
for power; thus, there is no reason to wait from “wise policy maker[s] or 
diplomat[s]” to add the “universal human rights” into their rational calculations.17 
Related to the introduction of human rights into the field of political affairs 
and international politics, this chapter will consider the process of this introduction as 
linked with a constructivist perspective. However, in addition, it will be underlined 
that one of the most important kinds of challenges to the principled beliefs on human 
rights has come from the political realist point of view.18 Accordingly, the main 
argument of this chapter will be in line with the understanding that realism is a direct 
challenge to human rights, in both moral and practical contexts. Although for some, 
realism has had a certain failure in explaining “the introduction and increasing 
                                                 
15
 David Forsythe, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 30.  
16
 Forsythe, Human Rights and International Relations, p.49.  
17
 Forsythe, Human Rights and International Relations, p.48.  
18
 Realism, in this work, must be understood with the classical components of states as actors, power, 
state-interests, survival, and anarchy. Any structural explanation, e.g. through neo-realism, will not be 
given a particular concern. 
 9 
influence of human rights in international relations,”19 it is also true that realism, 
through its principles based on states’ survival, interests, and sovereignty, has 
remained a key limitation to the invigoration of the human-rights regime in world 
politics. Therefore, some answers from practical and moral realm will be given to 
explain the complexity between human rights and realist arguments in international 
relations.    
 
2.2. Understanding the Role of Ideas 
Ideas must be given importance within the realm of international politics. Ideas can 
stem from a constructive process in which a general system can bind all actors with a 
similar aim. However, ideas can be thought also parts of actors’ decision-making 
process. For Keohane and Goldstein, “ideas influence policy when principled or 
causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about 
goals or ends-means relationship, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in 
which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political 
institutions.”20 Thus, rather than mainly focusing on the interest-side of the state-
action, ideas should be taken also seriously to grasp the “causal weight” it had “in 
explanations of human action.”21  
While it is true that “policy outcomes can be explained only when interests 
and power are combined with a rich understanding of human beliefs,”22 this might 
not change the result that the interest and profit-maximization can have the final role 
in giving a decision. In this context, “there is little difference between rationalism 
                                                 
19
 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 131.  
20
 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Judith Goldstein, Robert O. 
Keohane (eds.) (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 3.  
21
 Goldstein and Keohane, p. 4. 
22
 Goldstein and Keohane, p. 13. 
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and constructivism on the issue of whether ideas ‘matter’,”23 because in both of 
them, ideas are seen at the core of actions. However, problems occur in situations 
where ideas seem to be removed from the agenda of the final decision. Under these 
circumstances, “materialism” or the interest-driven aims based on a pure account of 
the material thinking, rather than rationalism, might play the crucial role.24 
Related to the process of understanding the ideas, norms and their effects on 
actions, Wendt and Fearon underline some main characteristics of constructivism 
that might be used also for the issue of human rights’ idealization and 
internationalization. As one of these characteristics, “the role of ideas in constructing 
the social life” has the prominence.25 Considering the practical effects of this role, 
constructivists differ from idealists and subjectivists in their objective inquiry for the 
role of ideas in addition to their recognition of material capabilities and interests as 
well.  
Accordingly, for Adler, “when drawn upon by individuals, the rules, norms 
and cause-effect understandings that make material objects meaningful become the 
source of people’s reasons, interests and intentional acts;” and as a case study on 
human rights can show, “when institutionalized, they become the source of 
international practices.”26 In this framework, from a constructivist point of view, “the 
socially constructed nature” of the agents is crucial in saying that these agents may 
not have an externally-given, stable and fully rational nature; so they can be 
understood as “dependent variables” linked with some other factors (ideology,  
                                                 
23
 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in 
Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons (eds.) 
(London: Sage, 2002), p. 59. 
24
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history, culture, etc.). 27 
Consequently, the ideational perspective on human rights in this work must 
be understood in line with the practical consequences which mean that the direct 
effect of ideas and idea-generation upon the belief-system of people and upon the 
decisional field of statesmen is substantial. As Keohane and Goldstein underline, 
these practical beliefs can appear in different forms like as “principled beliefs” 
through which the right or just action is followed. They can be thought as linked with 
the “normative ideas”28 many of which have led to fundamental changes in 
international politics particularly following the end of the Second World War. 
Because such beliefs can be linked to the general realm of world views, they have 
also an intermediary role in “translat[ing] fundamental doctrines [stemming from the 
world view] into guidance for contemporary human action.”29  
 
2.3. Ideational Field of Human Rights: Internationalization of Domesticity  
As an idea and a kind of principled belief, human rights can be defined as “the rights 
that one has simply because one is human.”30 They are universal, because “every 
human being has them;” egalitarian because everyone possess them equally; and 
inalienable, because “one cannot stop a human being, and thus cannot stop having 
these rights.”31  
Although, the basis of human rights-idea has been searched within the history  
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of Western political philosophy,32 and although this basis has been linked with the 
Lockean natural rights tradition in the seventeenth century, and with the effects of 
American and French Revolution in the eighteenth century, the developments during 
and after the Second World War had a significance to evaluate the process congruent 
with the current definition of the idea of human rights. Therefore, for various writers, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” in 1941 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 must be given as the key turning points.33  
In this context, although it is argued that “before World War II, how a state 
treated its own habitants was no one else’s business,”34 the situation seemed to be 
changed following the end of the War and following the declarations of the new 
documents on general and fundamental rights. On the other hand, there have been 
some ongoing confusions regarding the status of international human rights. For 
instance, Henkin emphasizes the importance of national systems while arguing that 
there is “no international human rights.”35 Thus, for him, similar to democracy or 
constitutionalism, human rights must be evaluated within the national level, and 
related to that, international human rights must be linked with the “international 
responsibility for national human rights, that is, rights within societies.”36  
In contrast with the opinion based on the passivity of international 
mechanisms, the international human rights law has been given as a field that is an 
important source to talk about the primary role attributed to human rights in 
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international relations. In this perspective, some key processes are defined such as 
“(1) human rights is increasingly a well-established issue area of international 
politics; (2) states are increasingly obligated to respect human rights norms; and (3) 
individuals have increasingly obtained legal personality, in the form of partial 
subjectivity, with regard to human rights matters.”37  
In this regard, for the realization of human rights at different levels, Galtung 
approaches the problem from a historical-structural perspective. Thus, “national 
human rights can be seen as parts of a contract or covenant between the state and 
human beings/citizens,” and “for international human rights, a three-tier world 
context with three constructs is needed: individual, states, and communities/ 
organizations of states.”38  
Related to this framework, as Forsythe mentions “[i]nternational relations 
underwent a fundamental change from 1945 to 1970 in the sense that human rights 
ceased to be generally considered a matter fully protected by state sovereignty.”39 
When we came to 1970, the signature and voting processes of several treatises within 
the body of the United Nations (UN), or within some regional groupings, such as in 
Europe, began to contribute to the “internationalizing” of human rights.40  
At that point, the argument can be seen consistent with the idea that human 
rights as a construction of Western ideology has been institutionalized and 
“internationalized” through various processes.41 Thus, on each state, a human rights’ 
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effect has been thought within both domestic and foreign politics. In view of that, 
Forsythe claims: 
For some three hundred years the notion of national sovereignty has been 
widely accepted. It has been believed that states had the right to do as they 
pleased within their territorial jurisdiction. The human rights movement 
reflects the notion that states are obligated to meet certain standards in how 
they treat their nationals even within their own territory and non-national 
bodies as specified in treaties are entitled to comment or take action on 
human rights issues.42 
 
Within the context explained above, although states have continued to be the sole 
representatives of practical applications, international law via the multilateral 
channels has seemed to pave the way for a re-evolution of the un-limited 
interpretation of state-sovereignty within the normative field.43  There have been 
other arguments that the loss of power inside the internal political realm of states has 
been followed by the dimension of “sharing the stage” more frequently with the other 
actors in international politics. Hence, influential international organizations like the 
United Nations, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) have been expected to be the reasons for a 
more “restricted” states’ sovereignty.44  
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Consequently, it can be claimed that one of sovereignty’s important aspect in 
the “exclusive competence in internal affairs” is challenged by the existence of a 
human rights regime and by the individual, legal, and institutional claims against the 
states when there is a “violation of internationally recognized human rights.”45 
 
2.4. Human Rights and Realism in International Politics 
Although human rights has a long conceptual and ideational history, especially in the  
sense of Western political thinking, its active role as commonly accepted set of rules 
and principled beliefs in world-politics became discernible, or “a more salient issue” 
after the end of the Second World War in 1945.46 However that does not mean that 
the full inclusion of human rights (with its general and universal structure) into the 
state agenda happened immediately. For instance, it is known that during the Cold 
War that is characterized by the two-Bloc system in the world, Western and Eastern 
Blocs appeared with different priorities. So, the West was identified with the 
traditional civil/political rights, while the East was continuing to play the defender of 
economic and social rights.47  
One substantial problem that arose as a result of states’ different priorities has 
been the issue of selectivity which hindered to reach a complete universality in 
human rights.  Accordingly, one of the relevant problematic dimensions following 
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the internationalization of human rights after 1945 could be defined as the active role 
of states for the manifestation of rights-based principles, while they were continuing 
to violate the same principles.  
A possible active role for states in the implementation of human rights norms 
has not changed the reality that they “bring with them their national history, 
character, self-image, and nationalism.”48 For some, this diversity can be regarded as 
positive and as a rule of pluralism in the field of human rights. However, when we 
start to think “the security dilemma of states” in a Hobbesian base; claiming that no 
one can be in a fully secure environment because of the possibility of the threat from 
the other,49 then there is the important question of disparity in the enforcement 
mechanism of human rights. Usually, the winner out of this disparity is the states 
with their interests; in fact this means that each national state turns out to be a winner 
within its own field against human rights.  
Forsythe claims, even in the acceptance of different kinds of universal human 
rights, the principle of interest turns out to be the main issue. The strong support 
from the United States (U.S.) to the classical rights such as freedom of the individual, 
but its ignorance of the social and economic base of this freedom can be given as an 
example to this argument.50 However, not only for the U.S., but for many other 
states, including the representatives of the “Western liberal” world, or of the 
“illiberal” group of states,51 the problem of selectivity, and the denial of human rights 
as a whole constitutes a part of rationalism’s52 and realism’s initial strength against  
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the enhancement of the principles of human rights.  
In fact, between human rights and the whole field of the international 
relations, one general dilemma is found and claimed by Müllerson. He says that the 
ultimate aim of the understanding of human rights is not “being an instrument for 
peace and stability.”53 Although the regime of human rights seems to function 
together with the terms such as peace or stability, the purpose behind the logic of 
human rights must be grasped as the “promotion and protection of rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”54 This brings the problematic aspect in which the aims at the 
individual or particular level within a state can lead to “the deterioration of inter-state 
relations,”55 or to a conflict “with other interest that may be more important in a 
particular instance.”56  
At this point, the principles of realism come to our mind. To which extent a 
state can risk the stability of internal politics which backs its strength in the 
international realm, and of its international relations with one or more than one state 
in the name of preserving morally-binding rules? Or is there no risk to talk about, 
because there is no ground for human rights in realist calculation of politics? 
 
2.4.1. Realism and Its Interpretation of Human Rights within the Practice of 
Political Affairs  
Realism has been one of the prominent “paradigms” in international affairs since the 
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Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.57 But Frankel is correct 
to say that “there is no single realist theory of international relations,”58 rather 
throughout the history, different types emerged according to the context of politics. 
Considering the attempts to re-evaluate the classical realist line throughout of the 
second half of the twentieth century, Krasner tries to clarify the difference between 
the positions of the realist and neo-realist attitudes. For him, the statement “states as 
autonomous” is the “ontological given” for the neo-realist position, whereas in the 
traditional sense of realism, the issue of “uncertainty” is more significant than in neo-
realism.59 This is in line with the traditional explanation in favor of “the discretion of 
the statesmen.”60 The separation is clear after analyzing Waltz’s neo-realist structural 
theory of realism and his classification of the state, the individual, and the structure 
as different levels of analysis.61  
Considering the diversity of opinion within the realist school, Rochester 
responds with three key assumptions and commonplaces. First, states are “the 
leading actors” in world-politics. So, as in Krasner’s explanation, “the Westphalian 
state sovereignty”62 was the beginning of the realist principle of territorial integrity 
and non-intervention principle of realism. This dimension has become discernible in 
neo-realism which sees these sovereign states as the “constitutive actors of the 
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system.”63 In this system, the intergovernmental actors other than states, such as the 
United Nations, can have a limited role; and they can behave simply as “mere 
extensions of nation states.”64 Secondly, states are “unitary, rational actors,” and 
rationality leads them to pursue their own interests, specifically national interests, 
which can be evaluated first in the means of military-security affairs. Third, the 
anarchic feature of the world order is the key factor in predicting the state behavior 
related to “struggle for power and security.”65 This aspect was much more important 
for the neo-realist school during 1970s and 1980s in which neo-realists attempted to 
predict and systematize different kinds of state behavior in the anarchic world 
structure.66 
Considering the main features of realism, Forsythe sees the problem between 
human rights and realism, as a problem of “collision of two systemic facts.”67 
Accordingly, “the anarchical environment,” “no higher authority,” and “self-help of 
states” are the characteristics of the first; and “global governance,” “the existence of 
international law,” “attention to human rights” and “state-citizen relations that are 
surpassing the state borders” are the features of the second system.68   
Thus, contradictions are unavoidable. For instance, for a state sovereignty is 
“the complete authority to regulate everything and everybody” in order to seek and 
preserve the power in the international field; however human rights might be 
formulated by some supranational principles that can go beyond the nation-states’ 
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borders, and can serve in favor of individuals, but to the disadvantage of the states.69 
Within this dynamic, in contrast to the rules of the international law and the 
limitation of power according to some pre-defined principles, realism appears to be 
congruent with the theory of rationalism and power. The aim of realism can be 
expressed as “power without law,”70 and within the framework of this power, 
“rights” seem to be the “rationalized interests of winners, imposing obligations on 
losers.”71  
From a realist perspective, human rights conventions are “consistent with the 
international legal sovereignty, understood as the right of a state to enter into 
agreements voluntarily.”72 However, as Landman argues, understanding “the 
material and/or power incentives” is significant to comprehend the realist attitude of 
foreign policy making in terms of human rights.73 Therefore, “[the] state will pursue 
a pro-human rights policy if and only if that policy is in line with its other geo-
strategic interests.”74 Since the concern of the realist agenda is based on states and 
the interests of states, rational calculations cause states to implement a human rights 
agenda within the context of the interest agenda.  
As a consequence, the intersection of the rationalist/realist aims and human 
rights principles is possible in some cases, but “the virtual absence of real 
enforceability behind the extant international law of human rights” will be in line 
with the realist understanding of the existence of “sovereign” states in an “anarchic” 
world order.75 This statement is critical to understanding the presence of interest-
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seeking actors and maximization of power in world politics.76 For instance, regarding 
the Cold-War era, most American policies in the name of human rights should not be 
thought as acts that were done within the framework of the correctness of human 
rights in the moral field. It has been widely claimed that the United States “showed 
little concern for ensuring respect for human dignity, when they sacrificed human 
rights, and supported repressive regimes in different parts of the world”77 in order to 
preserve its good relations with the “friendly or anticommunist countries” against the 
“Communist threat.”78 
Furthermore, for Krasner, states’ participation in the human rights regime 
established by the treaties of the UN after 1945 can offer rational explanations for 
states.79 For instance, the signature to a human rights agreement can be seen as “a 
cognitive script that defined appropriate behavior for a modern state,” 80 rather than 
as the approval of all the principles with a fully moral understanding. In another 
example, human rights can be used to support another calculation as in the Soviet 
case where the state’s participation was “a ploy that could be used to increase 
support in third countries”81 or to have a more flexible platform for economic or 
security-reasons.  
To observe the intersection of rationalist/realist calculations with the human 
rights principles, particular attention could be paid to the Soviet Union during the 
process of Helsinki Final Act in the mid-1970s.82  When the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern Bloc countries signed this Act in 1975 along with the Western Bloc and 
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adopted substantial norms on human rights, they trusted one of the significant 
principles of international law expressed in the first part of the Final Act: “rule of 
non-intervention” into another state’s internal affairs.83 However, the Soviet 
leadership could not calculate the long-term effects of its foreign policy maneuver in 
Helsinki.  
On the other hand, with respect to U.S. state interests that were shaped 
throughout the subsequent periods (especially under the administration of Ronald 
Reagan after 1980), a principled approach based on democracy and human rights 
against the Soviet-Bloc was one important source of Western strength against the 
authoritarian Eastern Bloc. Accordingly, Müllerson is correct to say that during the 
post-Helsinki process after 1975, Western plans did not achieve their ultimate aims 
against the East immediately as a result of the continuation of the same “social, 
economic and political system” in communist countries.84 However after ten years, 
radical transformations within the Eastern Bloc became a discernible reality of the 
Cold-War era.  
Several reasons have been suggested to explain the regression of communist 
systems against the West. One of these is the intersection of human rights principles 
and rationalist calculations of Western Bloc countries during the rivalry against the 
Eastern Bloc. One of the underlying causes for of the success of the West was the 
increasing support provided to the rising dissident-movement in the Soviet Bloc.85 
Hence, the formation of Helsinki Groups and the emergence of strong dissidence in 
the Eastern Bloc countries can not be fully understood without reference to the 
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Helsinki Process and the policy maneuvers undertaken through the realist 
calculations of Cold-War decision-making.86  
 
2.4.2. Realist Challenge against the Normative Morality of Human Rights  
One of the dilemmas surrounding the relationship between realism and human rights 
concerns the moral component of the debate. First of all, we should define human 
rights in accordance with the acceptance of some morally binding norms, and this 
morality should inform the material side of relations through mechanisms such as 
international or domestic law. Accordingly, documents such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 or International Covenants in Civil/Political 
and Economic/Social/Cultural Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR) in 1966, which have 
played critical roles in combining abstract morality with the material side of state-
individual relations, were accepted by the great extent of the world. 
Problems occur when one addresses the base of realist assumptions which 
appear to be the opposite of rights-based morality. Morgenthau claims that “foreign 
policy is not an enterprise devoid of moral significance,” however the term 
“relativity” has always played a considerable role in the morality of foreign policy.87 
This means both the time frame and country are important to determine which 
principle is to be chosen in the realm of foreign policy.88 As Forsythe and Donnelly 
remark, the ethics or “moral issues” are combined with the national interest in 
realism.89 In other words, it is not the morality of principles such as human rights, 
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but the morality of national interest and the behavior according to this interest which 
is the main obligation of the state.90 
Even before the declaration of prominent human rights documents, some 
leading realists such as Morgenthau made claims against the generalization of rights. 
For him, the term “democracy” and some of such fundamental rights as freedom of 
speech or freedom of press have been misused. So, the abstract and possibly 
deleterious effects of moral human rights have created new contradictions, such as 
when the right for speech or religion necessarily must be “enjoyed by everybody 
within and without the national frontiers, even by the foe who claims the rights only 
in order to be able to monopolize it.”91 
The uncertainty due to the abstract nature of human rights is restated by 
Morgenthau in his Politics among Nations.92 As a result, “to change the world for the 
better” have always remained as a controversial issue.93 This is because politics and 
the realm of morality do not fully coincide. For Morgenthau, the “impossibility of 
enforcing the universal application of human rights” 94 is a reality. Pursuing, or 
defending universal human rights principles is not “the prime business for a state” 
which must consider all aspects of its foreign policy.95 
Forsythe argues that following the developments after the Second World War, 
supporters of human rights principles have tried to “institute the rule of law on behalf 
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of human rights.”96 Moreover the attempts within the regional framework, e.g. 
European initiatives through the Council of Europe,97 have demonstrated that the 
moral ground of human rights is not limited in the domestic field, but will have a role 
in the international relations via the supranational bodies of international law.98 In 
contrast with this legalistic approach, for the realist position, the principle of the 
anarchic world order is one of the foundations of the state behavior in the 
international sphere. This means that there is no higher authority above the state, and 
in the final analysis, this lack of higher authority requires adequate measures for self-
defense in order to protect against further attempts from any other state. Such an 
understanding accords with Morgenthau’s separation of the principle of the “rule of 
law” in domestic politics from the international sphere.99 
Another matter for discussion concerns the separation of the individual level 
of decision making from the collective level. Therefore, the arguments of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, who is known as one of the key figures in shaping the realist position, 
become significant with respect to differentiating individual and collective morality. 
He states his argument as follows: 
Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider 
interests other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are 
capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own. 
They are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration 
for their kind, […] But all these achievements are more difficult, if not 
impossible, for human societies and social groups.100 
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As is apparent from Niebuhr’s explanation, beyond the individual level which 
includes communities and societies, “the challenge of empathy”101 or the lack of 
understanding for the rights of the others helps to determine the failure of “the 
unrestrained group egoism.”102 This egoism has a direct impact on the relations 
between different groups, and for Niebuhr, the concept of “power” is prevalent. He 
writes that “relations between groups must therefore always be predominantly 
political rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of 
power which each group possesses at least as much as by any rational and moral 
appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group.103  
One can adapt Niebuhr’s approach to the level of the state which is the 
modern form of an organized society. Rather than individuals who act with an aim to 
understand another individual, the state, or government, a collective body and seeks 
only its own interest, is the focus of realist theory.104 In fact, Wolfers argues this 
interest might not be isolated from the people of a country. If we consider interest in 
terms of “nation,” and “national survival,” state acts in the name of “national 
interest” can be equated to the general public interest.105 This might serve as a source 
of the legitimatization of state-power as well, but, as Niebuhr stresses, once 
economic and political power belong to the state, there is no decisive “social” or 
“ethical” source of restraint against this power.106  Thus, with respect of power, an 
important role is conceded to the state.  Nevertheless the question arises as who will 
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be responsible for restraining the state? This appears to be an unanswerable question 
because this characteristic of the state raises it to the level of “mortal God.”107 
Accordingly, in the roots of realism’s classical understanding of human 
nature, although humans (as individuals) are regarded as capable to act morally and 
to understand each other in ethical terms, they are also “evil” and “egoistic.”108 This 
notion is deeply linked connected to the state’s “self-help” in the “anarchic” global 
system in which the application of moral rules such as human rights are “foolishly 
unsuccessful,” and will lead states to become “vulnerable” to other states’ 
interests.109 Therefore, for a rational realist decision-maker there is no room for 
morality in foreign policy.110 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
“Human rights are clear examples of what constructivists call ‘social constructions’ – 
invented social categories that exist only because people believe and act as if they 
exist, that nevertheless come to have the capacity to shape the social and political 
world.”111 However, as Donnelly insists “realist and legal positivist conceptions 
[which are based on ‘the sovereign prerogative of states’] have continued to shape 
dominant international human rights practices.”112 From a statist point of view, 
human rights can be regarded as a matter which is nothing more than relations 
between “rulers and ruled.”113 
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Developments in the name of human rights, especially following the end of 
the Second World War, have not signaled a significant departure from states’ past 
practices. Krasner explained that such practices have always been part of the agenda 
of sovereign states, through different names, such as minority issue or religious 
toleration; the only different thing is the declaration of new conventions which are 
also depended on the sovereign will of states.114 
Thus, at the core of threat posed by the state to the morally binding structure 
of universal human rights principles, the following elements should be taken into 
consideration: The idea of the supremacy of the state, the priority given to the state’s 
interests, and the freedom of states to behave in an ungoverned, anarchic world. 
Hence, world politics, as structured by rationalist/realist foreign policy agendas, 
helps to explain the arguments such as Donnelly’s that “international human rights 
initiatives are almost always subordinated to security interests, and usually 
subordinated to economic interests as well.”115 Congruent with realist premises, 
according to a statist line of explanation human rights can not be internationalized, 
and in fact have always remained “as a matter of sovereign national jurisdiction.”116  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLICY CHOICES  
IN THE ERA OF DÉTENTE 
 
 
 
 
In a world in which major adversaries see themselves locked in an 
irreconcilable ideological and political conflict, there is little room 
for the pursuit of human rights concerns. In fact, there is small 
reason to believe that the language of human rights will be used for 
any purpose other than to attempt to gain political advantage.117 
 
3.1. Introduction 
During the Cold War, one cannot speak of the hegemonic status of one state over the 
ideas of human rights.118 This is primarily due to the presence of different ideological 
blocks that defended their own position regarding the common conception of human 
rights. The post-war era, at which time a common way was found by various states 
through the emergence of some international human rights documents, was merely 
an era of “deceptively false consensus” due to the fact that human rights documents 
and covenants and their ratification were viewed as “an assertion of membership in 
the world community,” but “not a commitment to the implementation of these rights 
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or to their legitimacy.”119 Therefore, under the pressure of rising ideological 
competition it was thought “time-consuming and controversial” to make attempts “to 
translate the Universal Declaration into supposedly enforceable treaties.”120  
Related to the main foreign policy developments of the Cold War, a 
communis opinio exists among certain scholars that “the international law of human 
rights is based on liberalism, but the practice of human rights all too often reflects a 
realist world.”121 This realism reflected also the ideological cleavages and brought a 
separation inside the field of human rights. For instance, during the Cold War, 
economic and social rights were dismissed by many scholars due to the fact that 
contrary to Soviet rhetoric on economic and social forces, there always existed “the 
West’s emphasis on individual freedoms and civil and political rights.”122 Starting 
from the division between different types of rights, the tension between civil/political 
and economic/social rights appeared to be more severe in the practice because of the 
attitude conducted by several “national elites” who had different priorities 
concerning freedom and equality.123  
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From a kind of Western, liberal perspective, during the ideological 
polarization of the Cold War the division over rights represented an attempt of the 
Eastern Bloc to institutionalize the primacy of society and its needs over the 
individual and his/her interests. Although socio-economic rights like food, shelter or 
education might not be separated from individual autonomy and human rights in 
general, the ideological debate exacerbated the tension begun in the Cold-War. This 
led to the emergence of different sides as supporters of different kinds of rights, i.e. 
United States as the defender of civil/political realm and Soviet Union as the 
supporter of economic/social realm.124 In fact, behind the ideological cleavages, the 
Cold War led to the mere usage of human rights “for political purposes which were 
far from a genuine concern.”125 Thus, states appeared to be actors who had already 
forgotten the ideals of human rights “for the sake of raison d’état.”126 
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This chapter attempts to relate the characteristics of the international 
environment by explaining the era of détente and the normative structure that was 
created through the initiatives like the Helsinki Process (1972-1975). By paying 
particular attention to American and Soviet approaches in the specific field of human 
rights, the chapter seeks to demonstrate that the détente period did not bring any 
radical changes to the pure states’ point of view and interest-driven structure of 
international relations.   
 
3.2. Period of Détente  
After a period of high tensions like the Hungarian Uprising (1956), Cuban Missile 
Crisis (1962), Suez Canal Crisis (1956) and Arab-Israeli confrontation (1948- ),   
commencing with Richard Nixon’s presidency in the United States (U.S.) in 1969 a 
new period began in which several accords and agreements emerged as a sign of 
détente between the major powers of the Cold War.127 This period was to continue 
until 1980 in which the deteriorating impacts of “misjudged” and “miscalculated” 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were being felt.128  
With respect to détente Henry Kissinger, mentions that “the United States and 
the Soviet Union are ideological rivals. Détente cannot change that.” Thus, for such 
influential statesmen, despite the presence of a discernible positive atmosphere 
between the rivals following the late 1960s, détente could be only another way of 
interpreting “national interest,” or “simply trying to discipline [the ideological 
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struggle] by precepts of national interest.”129 Consequently, such judgments as that of 
Gaddis are relevant for this period: 
Détente had been meant to lower the risks of nuclear war, to encourage a 
more predictable relationship among Cold War rivals, and to help them 
recover from the domestic disorders that had beset them during the 1960s. It 
had not been intended, in any immediate sense, to secure justice: that could 
only emerge, most of its supporters believed, from within a balance of power 
that each of the great powers considered legitimate.130 
 
On the part of the United States a reinterpretation of rivalry was a necessary act of 
foreign policy due to the various internal reasons (e.g. “Vietnam” or “Watergate”).131 
So, détente served also as “a barometer of domestic controversies” rather than a mere 
“subject of serious analysis.”132 In this regard, in the logic of détente the mentality on 
the American side is rationalized by Kissinger by means of a patently realist outlook. 
Although enmity did not come to an end, and appeasement of the enemy could not 
occur again it had before the Second World War, there were some calculations that 
had to be made by the Americans. Kissinger argues: 
An American President thus has a dual responsibility: He must resist Soviet 
expansionism. And he must be conscious of the profound risks of global 
confrontation. His policy must embrace both deterrence and coexistence, both 
commitment and an effort to relax tensions. […] Yet if we pursue the 
ideological conflict divorced from strategy, if confrontation turns into an end 
in itself, we will lose the cohesion of our alliances and ultimately the 
confidence of our people.133 
 
 Congruent with the American calculations, from the perspective of the Soviet 
Union the détente period was understood as a razryadka or “relaxation of tension.”134 
While explaining the moderate relations with the Western countries during this era, 
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Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador in Washington, wrote that Soviet “foreign 
policy pronouncements were increasingly based on the idea of peaceful coexistence 
with these countries despite their different system.”135  
 In fact, it was known that behind the Soviet idea of coexistence, the 
hostilities and “aggressive connotations”136 continued to exist; but the practical 
necessities of the period should be taken into consideration. For instance, before and 
after the 1970s, as several writers claim, “the Soviet Union’s economy and those of 
its East European satellites were stagnating.”137 The figures on economy vary in 
different assessments,138 but it was true that economic reforms became necessary on 
the eve of détente. As Dobrynin emphasizes, 
[t]he Soviet leadership knew that the country was in a difficult situation. The 
Soviet economy and living standards were stagnant. Famous dissidents were 
emerging, such as the physicist Andrei Sakharov and the author Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn. Underground samizdat publications showed that discontent was 
growing among our educated class. The sharp exacerbation of our relations 
with China and uncertainty in our relations with the United States led to 
greater military expenditures, which strained national budget.139 
 
Accordingly, “the failures of Marxism-Leninism” in creating adequate prosperity 
within the spheres dominated by Soviet power, and a desire for a “continued 
stability” were some reasons to journey on the road to détente with the Americans.140 
Therefore, détente has a significant function within the overall analysis of the 
Cold War. This significance results from its role in “freez[ing] the Cold War in 
place.”141 In this role, however, détente was never manipulated to end the deep 
conflict between the rivals, “but rather to establish rules by which it would be 
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conducted.”142 Negotiations and agreements on the limitation of so called “Strategic 
Arms,” and the coming Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I) were one set of 
the substantial rules of this era. So, SALT I appeared as an historic development due 
to the fact that for the first time the two major powers, USA and USSR, deliberately 
rested their security on each other’s vulnerability.”143 The normative environment 
was also shaped by other key developments, such as the Helsinki Process, throughout 
the 1970s. 
 
3.3. Helsinki Process and Human Rights Norms  
The Helsinki process or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) has been viewed as “the high-water mark of the détente era of the 1970s,” 
and it appears as “the very symbol of détente, and its most ambitious 
manifestation.”144 In the origins of this conference between European states, 
including the Soviet Union and the United States, there was a well-known desire to 
arrive at solutions to the problems introduced by the divisions following the Second 
World War. This desire “was followed by a number of ideas brought forward by 
statesmen and scholars in both East and West based on the concept of pan-European 
security.”145 It is known that as early as 1965-1966, the Eastern Bloc under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union and Leonid Brezhnev developed “the idea for a 
European conference,” but events, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
placed obstacles to the implementation of this plan.146  
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In fact, when the process began in 1972, the CSCE appeared to be “a Soviet 
project” to several Western governments, and as several statesmen argued there was 
“no reason to help it along.”147 The U.S. attitude was especially negative, and for 
statesmen like Kissinger, the conference was a direct “concession to the Soviets.”148 
However, during the course of negotiations, “the Soviet desire to bring the CSCE to 
a successful summit conclusion,” which was actually the prime mover behind the 
event, was to be used skillfully by the West and by the United States’ 
representatives.149 
There are ten main principles which made the Helsinki Accords possible as 
part of a consensus on security in Europe. These principles, also mentioned in within 
Final Act are “I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty. II. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force. III. Inviolability of frontiers. IV. 
Territorial integrity of states. V. Peaceful settlement of disputes. VI. Non-
intervention in internal affairs. VII. Respect for Human Rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. VIII. Equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples. IX. Cooperation among states. X. 
Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.”150  
On the other hand, three "Baskets," or groups of articles, emerged at the final 
process of the CSCE. Basket I, “Questions Relating to Security in Europe,” included 
issues on territorial matters, sovereignty, non-interference, and disarmament which 
have always been seen as the primary goal of participating states. Basket II was 
termed “Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of 
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the Environment,” whereas Basket III was “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other 
Fields.”151  
Although the Helsinki Final Act was a kind of triumph for the Brezhnev 
administration as a result of the unity of Europe under one agreement, the inclusion 
of Basket III on humanitarian issues (like rights and duties of citizens) was to have 
unexpected effects upon Soviet domestic and foreign agenda.152 This was mostly due 
to the new environment that was constructed upon the norms of new Helsinki 
Agreement leading “foreign states to take a legitimate interest in human and civil 
rights in the Soviet Union and its allies.”153  
The  Helsinki process thus became a more crucial player on account of “the 
normative effect of human rights provisions written into the Final Act,”154 and should 
be evaluated not only from of a rationalist account of Soviet decision-makers before 
and during the conference, but also from the perspective of dissidents in the 
Communist Bloc who began to base their arguments increasingly on  human rights 
rhetoric and on the legal accountability155of state decisions in the post-Helsinki era. 
In this regard, although the Helsinki document is less developed compared to other 
conventions and declarations in the field of human rights, in some issues it can be 
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more “explicit.”156 Thus, the process initiated by the CSCE might be thought more 
influential on “human rights situation” in the regional political levels than “treaty-
based systems.”157 
On the other hand, when one considers the Soviet approval of the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975, the reason for this policy maneuver appears to have been part of a 
strategy of “exchange for the Western acceptance of post-war territorial 
arrangements in Eastern Europe.”158 Soviet decision-makers had “no real intention of 
living up to the Act’s human rights provisions.”159 Considering the ten main 
principles of the Final Act, the Soviet attitude was in line with the defense of 
Principle 3 and 6 concerning the inviolability and non-intervention as opposed to the 
emphasis of Principle 7 on human rights.160 The same can be said for the Eastern 
European states whose policies established a direct link between human rights norms 
and “popular sovereignty.”161  
Within this framework, as Korey suggests, the Helsinki Process and the Final 
Act were “largely a product of trade-offs designed to maintain a balance between 
security concerns and human rights.”162 From the Soviet point of view the desire for 
a “European security conference designed to legitimize and perpetuate postwar 
territorial arrangements;”163 despite the human rights proposals of the Western states, 
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and particularly the European states, altered the process in ways the Eastern Bloc did 
not expect.  
During the Helsinki Process, the European insistence on human rights norms 
and increasing American diplomatic activity in collaboration with their Western 
European partners forced the Soviet side to change their strategy. Instead of rejecting 
a separate chapter that included human rights, the Soviet negotiators tried to “weaken 
[this chapter’s] authoritativeness by proposing that it [could] be interpreted ‘in 
accordance with the International Pacts of the United Nations on human rights, 
which contain loosely worded escape clauses relating to the protection of public 
safety, order, health, or morals.”164 As another aspect of their strategy, the Soviet 
side began to highlight their mutual economic expectations. These expectations were 
related to the increasing “emphasis on Basket Two” of the Helsinki Accords, can 
while “Moscow lured West Europeans as their supposedly ‘natural’ supplier of 
energy, positing a contrast between its reliability and American unpredictability.”165 
Nevertheless the Helsinki Final Act, which came into existence with its 
Basket III principles created a new normative spirit by indicating that “[t]he 
participating states will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.”166 This spirit would give inspiration to various 
groups to include the norms of human rights in their agenda. In Eastern Europe, “the 
word “Helsinki” has become synonymous with the promotion of human rights,”167 
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while many of the new peace movements in the West in addition to the human rights 
groups in the East are seen as the progeny of the agreement in Helsinki.168  
In this atmosphere, the acts of Western statesmen like U.S. President Carter’s 
personal dialog with prominent Soviet dissidents such as Sakharov and Bukovsky 
elicited a negative response from Soviet officials and led a more intense diplomatic 
environment following the Helsinki Accords. Thus, the principles of “sovereign 
equality” and “non-interference” were accepted once again as the guiding norms of 
state relations.169 The real danger of the Soviet insistence on sovereignty lay in the 
possibility that sovereign entity of the state could be used as “a kind of filter through 
which the [other] international norms [such as human rights] must be filtrated.”170 
 
3.4. U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights 
If one wants to study the human rights perspective in the U.S. foreign policy, the 
period of “limited support” between the years 1945-1952 invites scrutiny, whereas 
the period between 1953-1974 was characterized by “neglect.” 171 However, events 
of mid-1970s led to changes in American foreign policy as Congress started to 
change its approach towards the issue of human rights.172 As Shattuck argues, 
“during much of the Cold War, U.S. officials filtered human rights diplomacy 
through the prism of Soviet containment policy. U.S. diplomacy was often 
inconsistent, criticizing some countries for specific abuses while remaining silent 
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about similar practices elsewhere.”173 Accordingly, for a certain period of the Cold 
War, U.S. foreign policy was far from adopting and implementing human rights 
principles in its bilateral and foreign relations, and this was particularly true of the 
presidencies from Dwight Eisenhower until Gerald Ford.174  
The issue of human rights began to surface for the first time in a significant 
way during the Nixon presidency when Senator Henry Jackson and Representative 
Charles Vanik struggled to persuade Congress to pass a “Trade Reform Act” that 
denied “‘most-favored nation’ treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to any 
‘non-market economy’ that restricted or taxed the right to emigrate.”175 This struggle 
began immediately after the Kremlin’s decision to levy an “exit tax on emigrants 
leaving the USSR.”176 This decision was aimed at the Soviet Jewish population 
whose condition was being discussed more frequently in the U.S.177 For Gaddis, the 
success of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the Congress in 1975 was a sign that “a 
basic standard of human decency took precedence over the Cold-War policies so that 
neither national sovereignty nor the demands of diplomacy should allow states to 
treat their own citizens in any way they pleased.”178  
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The Trade Reform Act was harmful to the foreign policy of the Nixon-
Kissinger camp, but the liberal and conservative blocs did not hesitate to make an 
alliance to support the policy against the USSR. Kissinger asserted that “the liberals, 
preoccupied with human rights; and the conservatives, who became anxious about 
any negotiations with the Soviets” were the main opponents of his policies.179 For 
liberals, the Nixon administration with Kissinger was too “Machiavellian,” while for 
conservatives it was too “accommodating.”180   
In fact, also from the Soviet point of view, as ambassador Dobrynin suggests, 
it was true that some changes were discernible in American policy-decisions. This is 
why Soviet bureaucrats did not hesitate to declare that people like “right-wingers, 
liberal anti-communists and Jewish groups working together for free emigration and 
other human rights in the Soviet Union” as seen from the new Congressional 
initiatives such as the Jackson-Vanik Agreement.181 
Through actions like the Jackson-Vanik Agreement, or by way of Soviet 
dissident Andrei Sakharov’s letter to the U.S. Congress,182 realist foreign policy 
makers in the USA sensed that some challenging issues were arising against the old 
balances of power. While for such realists the human dimension was not an issue that 
could be ignored, the methods adopted by the “moralist” groups (Russian dissidents 
and their supporters in the U.S. Congress) were opposite of the “gradualist” line of 
diplomacy. Such a moralist change could thus worsen the situation in the Soviet 
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domestic sphere and could lead to “the weakening of the credibility” in the case of 
U.S. foreign policy.183  
 
3.4.1. President Carter and the Human Rights Agenda of the United States  
The hesitations of U.S. official circles in making human rights a core issue in foreign 
policy was reinterpreted during the presidential campaigns of Jimmy Carter and 
Gerald Ford in advance of the 1976 elections. Hence, one of the turning points for 
Carter as an idealist and supporter of human rights was in his election campaign 
when he criticized the failed response of Ford’s government to the human rights 
defenders (such as Ford’s negative response displayed against Russian or Eastern 
European dissidents as in the refusal to Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s possible visit to the 
White House).184 Furthermore, despite the presence of idealist rhetoric at first 
appearance, Carter’s new steps in the name of human rights ideals are connected to a 
“pragmatic assessment” of domestic circumstances.185 “Exhausted by the dual 
traumas of Watergate and Vietnam, many Americans welcomed a foreign policy that 
placed a new emphasis on human rights.”186 
This was no big surprise. When Carter became president, he declared his 
concern for “the fate of human rights activists and political prisoners in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.”187 The mid-1970s had already witnessed U.S. foreign 
policy maneuvers in the name of the ideals that were announced as elements of the 
comprehensive American approach to the world. Emphasizing human rights-abuses 
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in the countries of South America and the American Convention on Human Rights 
were major policies undertaken by the U.S. government at that time.188  
Attempts were made to rehabilitate the U.S. image as an “unconditional 
supporter of dictators and dictatorships” due to the fear of communism under the 
Carter presidency,189 while Latin American authoritarian governments were another 
target of Carter’s human rights terms.190 However, from a rationalist point of view, 
as Muravchik mentions, compared to Soviet officials, the leaders of Latin American 
countries did not possess the sort of "big stick" which Soviets did as “they could and 
did threaten not to cooperate in reaching a SALT agreement, thereby depriving 
Carter of the central goal of his foreign policy.”191  
Carter’s contacts with prominent Soviet dissidents through correspondence, 
(such as with Andrei Sakharov192), or through meetings (such as with Bukovsky) led 
to the direct Soviet grievance on U.S. “distrustful” behavior, and paved the way for 
the intensified pressure on voices of opposition inside Soviet territory.193 The harsh 
response of the Soviets at both domestic and international levels began to imperil the 
terms of the détente era. Priorities based on by realist bilateral conduct appeared to 
be the reason of the arguments on the Carter administration’s retreat “from 
outspoken criticism of Soviet human rights violations.”194  
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In order to grasp the final results of Carter’s presidency, Forsythe is right in 
saying that “Carter started out being a post-materialistic, post-Cold War President 
stressing global community,” but “America was still materialistic, and interstate 
relations was still dominated by the Cold War and other security clashes.”195  
Although Carter seemed to pursue an idealistic line while signing the two important 
human rights covenants, ICCPR and ICESCR, and while demonstrating a negative 
attitude towards states which had poor human rights records, at the end of the day he 
could not achieve satisfactory results from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy. In 
the international realm, the regimes which were replaced by the new ones such as 
Iran or Nicaragua did not have a positive attitude towards USA, nor did the Soviet 
Union behave as American decision-makers had expected when it invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979.196  
 
3.4.2. Different Approaches between Allies: Western Europe and United States 
on Human Rights 
Although the post-Second World War era led to a common agreement on the 
significance of recognizing universal rights, the following Cold War period is 
essential to understand the differentiation in states’ policies regarding the adoption of 
human rights. Different from any other regional experiences, in Europe human rights 
have been used as an important tool to maintain the unity among the people against 
the atrocities during and after the Second World War.  
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In Europe, a “regional focus” and “the process of building a unified [and 
stable] Europe” have been inseparable parts of normative and supranational 
developments regarding the human rights.197 The creation of the Council of Europe, 
the declaration of a separate European Convention on Human Rights, and later the 
awarding of jurisdiction to a supranational court in which individuals’ rights are 
protected against their own states are signs of the difference stemming from the 
relatively stronger ideational process in Europe.  
On the other hand, in the United States, Sikkink argues that the process has 
followed a diverse path for several reasons. One important factor was the Cold-War 
and the changing foreign policy priorities in the State Department of the U.S. Thus, 
until the second half of 1970s, there was a clear gap in American policies in 
recognizing human rights as a tool of multilateral policy. Although “democratic 
realists,” such as Kissinger, “might be liberals at home in their support for 
democracy and human rights, they were prepared to sacrifice foreign rights and 
foreign democracy to advance the interests of their state.”198  
 In contrast with the European experience, even when the immoral side of 
realism was weakened, and Americans were motivated to consider human rights in 
their policies towards other states, “the legal instruments and multilateral channels 
such as those provided by the European Convention” might have been in a secondary 
place compared to the primary role given to the “bilateral channels and more political 
forms of pressure.”199 
 Several reasons can be suggested for American inconsistency in using or not  
using human rights tools during the Cold War years until 1980. From an ideational  
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perspective, with respect to American hesitation to insist on human rights 
“anticommunism and the resulting distrust of the United Nations system 
continuously obstructed external and multilateral human rights policies.”200 
However, the reasons for the increasing popularity of rights’ rhetoric in 1970s were 
the national sentiment after the Vietnam experience, the growing “civil rights 
movement,” and increasing opposition to the Nixon administration due to internal 
problems such as Watergate.201  
It is likewise true that the ideational perspective can not be completely 
separated from the realm of state interests. Rather, as evident from Carter’s 
experience, “the power of ideas [can] reshape understandings of national interest.” 202 
In view of that, “[t]he adoption of human rights policies represented not the neglect 
of national interest but a fundamental shift in the perception of long-term national 
interests.”203  
 
3.5. Soviet Ideology and Policy versus International Human Rights 
From the beginning of the debate “both the concept and the terminology of human 
rights have been reluctantly accepted by the Soviet Union mainly as an unpleasant 
but inescapable reality of international relations.”204 During the Cold War, as a 
response to its Western adversaries, the Soviet state tried to use the idea of human 
rights according to its own ideology. This is why for Soviet official understanding,  
there was a clear distinction between political/civil rights and economic/social rights.  
Furthermore, there was the common perception that because “the bourgeoisie  
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states are unable to provide [economic/social/cultural rights] to the individual”, 
“priority” for the Western democracies has always been given to political/civil 
rights.205 Such an understanding was directly supported by Brezhnev in his speeches: 
We have no reason to shun any serious discussion of human rights. Our 
revolution, the victory of socialism in our country have not only proclaimed 
but have secured in reality the rights of working man whatever his 
nationality, the rights of millions of working people, in a way capitalism has 
been unable to do in any country of the world.206 
 
Accordingly, as Henkin mentions, the Soviet Bloc defended its own “socialist 
ideology” which was thought to represent “a sincere commitment to authentic human 
rights, especially to economic and social rights, and to the right of peoples to self-
determination and economic self-determination.”207 From the same perspective, in 
Soviet perception, the importance lies in the materiality of rights. Hence, the Soviets 
could claim that abstract civil and political rights were dependent on the material 
structure of social and economic rights. 208  
 The socialist doctrine of the USSR explains the source of an individual’s 
rights in line with his/her dependence on a collective identity. Hence, contrary to  
some Western critics “according to which the main criterion of man’s freedom lies in 
the measure of his autonomy from society and the state, socialist doctrine and 
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practice are based on the interests, aspirations and destinies of people being 
inseparably bound to a collective, society, and the state.”209 Thus, in Soviet ideology 
there could be violations of human rights only if these violations were “massive,” 
rather than “simple.”210 In the view of the Soviet state a violation could be a violation 
not because of the harm done to the individual, but rather because of the general 
harm done and the threat to the state's agenda.  
 In addition to the ideological dimension, the concept of power was 
reinterpreted in Soviet Russia through the Communist Party whose “raison d’étre 
[was in fact] its monopoly of power.”211 For Eide, the Marxist way of 
conceptualizing human rights “contributed towards building an ideological 
legitimization of the kind of excesses which were carried out in the Soviet Union.”212 
Especially, “the period of the personality cult” was the most significant period for 
these excesses. Through the evolution of the Soviet state from the original Marxist 
foundation, Toscano emphasizes an important point that the main theories have 
“switched from the classical Marxist idea of the class nature of rights to a theory that 
links the very existence of those rights to the state, beyond class and independently 
from class.”213 As a consequence, the holiness of the state, as the state for (and 
above) all citizens, has a direct reflection. 
Regarding the Soviet approach to the issue of human rights, and especially in 
light of the classical dimension of these rights encompassing both civil and political 
claims, the Soviet state behaved according to the principles of a realist and 
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ideologically-supported rationalist agenda. This is evident from the emphasis on state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and principle of non-interference. When the Jackson-
Vanik amendment started to pave the way for the first changes regarding the link 
between the U.S. Foreign policy and human rights, the Soviet state did not hesitate to 
describe the American interference as unacceptable.214 During the bilateral 
negotiations of the Helsinki Process, the same attitude was discernible. In this regard, 
Brezhnev’s following words are telling: 
The main conclusion, which is reflected in the Final Act, is this: no one 
should try, from foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, to 
dictate to other peoples how they should manage their internal affairs. It is 
only the people of each given state, and no one else, that have the sovereign 
right to decide their own internal affairs and establish their own internal laws. 
Any other approach would be precarious and perilous ground for the cause of 
international co-operation.215 
 
To sum up, in addition to the statist perspective of Soviet decision-makers 
who shared similar claims on states’ primacy with many others in both Eastern and 
Western Bloc at that time, the ideological component should not be  underestimated 
in order to understand the irreconcilability of Soviet human rights’ perspective and 
the Western conception of universal human rights.   
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In the policy field, this chapter has tried to demonstrate that the period of détente led 
to a new normative environment, as during the Helsinki Process. However, the final 
results derived from this period were not enough to go beyond the rationalism of 
states. On the other hand, regarding the issue of human rights, as Forsythe mentions 
“[f]rom roughly 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia endorsing supreme territorial 
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authority, to 1945 and the UN era, human rights were regarded as mostly within the 
competence of the nation-state. This changed fundamentally in both legal theory and 
diplomatic practice starting in 1945 with the UN Charter.”216 However, the relatively 
more collaborative environment after the Second World War also changed during the 
course of the Cold War. Consequently, there was no common way to strengthen the 
internationalization of universal human rights. 
Some domestic factors played a significant role during 1970s in 
understanding the “renewed interest” for human rights-issues in Western 
countries.217 For instance, in this period, U.S. President Carter planted a seed in 
defending and trying to adopt human rights ideals in foreign relations. However, his 
success was controversial because of his failure in reconciling these ideals with 
Realpolitik. Despite its ineffectiveness, the nourishment of Carter’s successors, i.e. 
Reagan, by Carter’s ideational seeds brought a reinvigoration to the U.S. foreign 
policy throughout the following periods.218  
On the other hand, from the Soviet perspective détente was intended to solve 
divisions in Europe, to gain new opportunities for economic progress, and to 
construct a more legitimate rhetoric for its international relations. Nonetheless, 
positive relations with the Western world were not accompanied by an internal 
reformation or relaxation. Especially following the Prague Spring in 1968, Brezhnev 
and his policies were the symbols of the determination “to control everything – even 
ideas – within their sphere of influence.”219 As a response to Soviet authoritarianism, 
the Helsinki Accords signified one of détente’s important phases by which new tools 
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for pressure emerged via the adoption of human rights norms within Basket III. A 
clear message was given that “progress in détente depends in part on progress toward 
the freer movement of people, ideas, and information.”220 
 Nevertheless, the Soviet response to these new developments could not be 
understood merely within a normative approach fostered by détente and the Helsinki 
Process. In the next chapter, I consider the human rights movement inside Soviet 
Russia. I suggest that statist/rationalist accounts of state elites in the Soviet Union 
coincided with realist premises in international politics in which survival does not 
depend on obedience of moral principles such as human rights in domestic politics, 
but rather on their effective usage of power to ensure the interest.  
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
 
 
 
LOOKING FROM THE DOMESTIC ANGLE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DISSIDENCE, STATE’S SUPREMACY 
 IN SOVIET RUSSIA  
 
 
 
 
[B]ut I believe that the relaxation of tensions is a 
constructive step toward the international protection of 
human rights in every country primarily because the 
process of working out détente is a process of discussion, 
including discussion of humanitarian problems.221 
 
At the center of my public activities remains my demand 
for worldwide political amnesty – for freedom for all 
prisoners of conscience. I consider this is a precondition 
for peace.222  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the general understanding of the dissidence or the opposition during 1960s and 
1970s, the concept of human rights had a pioneering role. For the intellectuals 
themselves, the human rights movement223 was the other meaning of dissident 
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activities in late 1960s and early 1970s.224 Actually among the various initiatives that 
contributed to the general term ‘dissidentsvo’225 in the Soviet Union, human rights 
movement represented only one dimension of the general picture. However, this 
dimension was different from dissidents’ other purposes, such as pure national or 
religious ones.226  
 It was known that following the de-Stalinization process, “[e]very movement 
was preoccupied with its own cause;” Jews with anti-Semitism and emigration, 
Baptists with religious persecution, Crimean Tatars with repatriation, or Lithuanian 
Nationalist Movement with independence.227 The main aspect that characterizes the 
particular movement for human rights of the Soviet Russian experience, especially 
within the second half of 1950s, was the general attribution to some civil and 
political rights that were suppressed continuingly under the authoritarian rule of the 
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Communist Party. Freedom of movement, freedom of thought and conscience, 
freedom of association are the first of these rights that are at the center of this 
chapter’s subject.  
Considering the economic and social aspect was an important supporting 
element for the Soviet official regime against the “politically liberal” and 
“individualist” Western world, economic and social rights played a secondary role 
for the case of human rights-based dissidence in Soviet Russia. The traditional side 
of human rights that has been described as the first generation civil and political 
rights was the main inspirational motive for many dissidents. Hence, the origins of 
these traditional rights within the American and European liberal philosophies led to 
the escalation of the conflict between the Soviet official ideology and dissidents’ 
ideas. 
Within this context, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, the idea of human 
rights is a precondition for Soviet (Russian) dissidents. Like in the Western societies, 
this idea is a step for democratization and reformation attempts.228 For this reason, 
although the pure human rights activists (with a Westernized conception of rights-
based rhetoric and with a moderate liberal line) are characterized as a small group of 
individuals within the general dissidence-movement,229 their human rights-based 
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values and principles gave the inspiration to the first well-known acts that led, in 
fact, to the stimulation for other groups in order to declare the grievances freely.  
 
4.2. Between De-Stalinization and Re-Stalinization: Understanding the 
Dissidence and the Emergence of the Human Rights Movement 
The speech of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in 
1956 on the atrocities of Stalin’s crimes230 gave new hopes to different circles within 
the Soviet society. For the intelligentsia, the period following the de-Stalinization 
was regarded as “the first taste of glasnost by the generation of the 1960’s,”231 and in 
fact, for several writers “one could not simply conceive of the dissident movement of 
the sixties and seventies without Khrushchev’s flexibility and liberalization.”232  
After Stalin’s period in which “there were laws (zakony) but no legality 
(zakonnost),”233 the Khrushchev era is defined as the beginning of a gradual 
expansion of the missing “legality” through the constitutional attempts. At the first 
glance, like Gorbachev, Khrushchev had believed in the “renovation of socialism.”234 
Therefore, the impact of Khrushchev on the intellectual life and on the emergence of 
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the dissidence was important.235 About this impact, Shatz underlines both positive 
and negative features of the new era: 
Unlike Peter the Great, Khrushchev did not implant in his society a wholly 
new set of human values, which would require decades to take root. Instead, 
he exposed the disparity that had developed between the stated values of the 
Soviet system and its actual practices. For this reason Soviet dissent has been 
able to develop much more rapidly than did the intelligentsia in the past. The 
effect, however, has been much the same: ‘a revolution from above’, in which 
a progress minded but authoritarian state introduced a far-reaching element of 
self-criticism which began to go beyond the bounds the state had set for it.236 
 
In this context, the first examples of the civic activism that appeared following the 
softening of the regime after the Stalinist era were a spontaneous and disorganized 
reaction to the changes. However, throughout the time the activism became a more 
political and organized feature.237  
Three main types of political response to the “thaw”238 of Khrushchev could 
be observable after 1956. First kind of these responses was in line with a more 
moderate understanding which is called by some writers as “liberal” or “moderate 
liberal” position.239 This position was directly nourished from some universal beliefs 
like human rights. Congruent with the moderate understanding, some prominent 
names began to criticize the official Marxist-Leninist line of human rights thinking 
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and the Soviet legal practice. They challenged the justice-concept as understood in 
the Soviet Union; and tried to argue for a more Westernized idea of the “rule of 
law.”240 The human rights movement was regarded as an inevitable tool to enter into 
the public debates and to achieve further reforms. In fact, in this way members of the 
intelligentsia in the moderate line were motivated to think about the gaps of the 
regime and to criticize the central rule. The most famous name in this group (and 
maybe within the whole movement of human rights) was Andrei Sakharov241 whose 
influence could be felt both in domestic and international affairs during the détente 
era.        
Within the dissidence, second kind of the response was based on the 
nationalist feeling that demanded the total abandonment of communism and the 
return to pre-revolutionary Russia. This line might be related with the slavophile-
thoughts that had emerged during the imperial time. Obviously concepts such as 
Orthodoxy242 were significant symbols of the opposition of this group who favored 
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the traditional values of the imperial times. Some prominent figures such Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn243 from this group became famous in the Western world due to their  
highly effective criticism based on rights-rhetoric and national sentiments.244  
Third kind of dissidents made their oppositions based on the idea of reform 
for socialism. They defended the reform with a human face. Roy Medvedev,245 who 
criticized mainly the failures of Stalin’s regime, was seen as a considerable 
representative of the struggle for the future attempts to reform socialism, as in the 
case of Gorbachev’s reform attempts in the Soviet Union within the following 
decade.246 
 
4.2.1. Dissidents vs. State’s Autocracy  
The removal of Khrushchev from power in the autumn 1964 was known and 
described as the period in which re-Stalinization policy replaced the attitude of the 
years 1956-1964.247 Among the elements of the new era, the removal of the negative 
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sides of Stalinist period like the purges, executions and forced-labor camps, and the 
emphasis on the positive sides, like the Five Year Plans and heroic features of the 
war years, were discernible.248  
The reflection of the new era under Nikita Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary 
of the Communist Party between 1964-1982, was observed also upon the intellectual 
life and upon the dissidents.249 One significant change was the adoption of new 
“techniques” against the dissidents by the regime. Although, the threats against the 
opponent voices were also existent during Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization years, the 
regime after 1964 relied more heavily on two powerful policies against the 
dissidents: “the technique of staging political trials of intellectuals” and “giving the 
KGB250 far greater powers in dealing with the intelligentsia.”251  
Whereas the period of de-Stalinization had a significant meaning for “the 
generation of 1956,” the influence of the trials of the dissidents was the turning point 
for “the generation of 1966.”252  The first trial was “the trial of Brodsky” in March 
1964 during the last months of the Khrushchev’s regime.253  In the following year, in 
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December 5, 1965, a demonstration in Moscow’s Pushkin Square took place with the 
slogan of “Respect the Soviet Constitution!” This event was regarded as a significant 
moment for human rights activists in the Soviet Union.254  
The famous Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial in 1966 was another critical event for the 
Soviet dissidence. The trial of these two writers, Yuly Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky, 
who were charged under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, with 
spreading “anti-Soviet propaganda” was evaluated as an obvious sign for a turn from 
the de-Stalinization politics and from the “thaw” into the period of repression.255 The 
trial of Daniel and Sinyavsky would be one of the first repression-example “reported 
by foreign radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union;” this means that people 
started to hear on arrests, trials and return of oppression.256 In fact, this trial signified 
a crucial moment for the coming periods, and as Blake mentions in her article in the 
The New York Times at that time, it “boomeranged by causing a national and 
international scandal, as well as by stiffening the intelligentsia’s resistance.”257 
 The opposition against the regime’s trials was continuing to be the main 
trouble for the Soviet government. The international protest about the Soviet attitude 
against the internal opposition was one side of the coin. On the other side, the 
intensification of the protests against the trials was the domestic reason of the 
regime’s stalemate. Despite this, the new trials followed the former ones. In January 
1967, four prominent intellectuals Yuri Galanskov, Alexei Dobrovolsky, Alexander 
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Ginzburg and Vera Lashkova were arrested because of their roles in samizdat258. 
When their trial began one year later, it was known as the “trial of the four.” Before 
the final decision of the court, it was claimed that Dobrovolsky had a compromise 
with KGB and thus, he denounced the other three. At the end he received two years 
of hard labor, Lashkova a year after the admission of her guilt; Galanskov and 
Ginzburg did not accept their guilt. Galanskov received seven years and Ginzburg 
five years.259 
Petro Grigorenko,260 in his Memoirs, talked about the intensification of the 
oppression of Brezhnev administration after 1964, and about the response of the 
dissident groups to this development. He argues: 
The authorities had planned the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel to be the event 
from which we would return to Stalinist methods of leadership: Nothing 
would be permitted without prior approval from authorities. […] Our open 
battle for human rights, and for observance of the law, had compelled the 
courts to retreat into the underground. […] A social movement had begun. 
The authorities were furious. There were new arrests and new trials, but 
always new protests followed. Repressions became a fact of life and the 
movement continued to grow. Throughout the country trials became the same 
as they were in Moscow – cruel sentences behind closed doors; but at the 
doors stood crowds of like-thinkers.261 
 
Consequently, the attempts for re-Stalinization and the increasing suppression 
between the years 1966-1968 were described by Alexeyeva as a turning point for a 
united human rights movement in the Soviet Russian territory. The “civic feelings” 
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that began to be developed among the people (initially among the prominent names 
from the intelligentsia and academia and among the students from universities) were 
combined with a “sense of morality” and “banishment from official society.”262 In  
such a way, a new unity began to mobilize around the idea of human rights.    
 
4.2.2. Chronicle of Current Events and the Idea of Human Rights 
The human rights movement with its organizational character can be described as the 
product or “phenomenon” of the Brezhnev-years. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization was 
the first step in order to grasp what did change in the Soviet Union after 1953. On the 
other hand, the ongoing repression of the opponent voices by the state and the first 
examples of this repression, like the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in 1966 and trial of the 
four in 1968, were considerable to evaluate the argument that the authorities’ effect 
on the dissidents in the late 1960s was more severe than in the previous and next 
decades.263 This situation led to the emergence of dissidents who saw themselves as 
activists for the sake of human rights, and who were regarded as public figures 
against “highly publicized show trials” of the regime.264 
In the Brezhnev era after 1964, among the acts in parallel with the opposition 
or dissidence movement, the samizdat265 played a substantial role in informing 
several others about what was going on within the country. Therefore, samizdat was 
crucial for the communication between several groups. Human rights movement 
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emerged also as an activity, which was partly based on this communication through 
the samizdat “networks” in 1960s.266 
Related to the different types of samizdat, the birth of the Chronicle of 
Current Events (hereafter mentioned as the Chronicle) in April 1968 was a major 
development for the dissidence movement in general and human rights movement in 
particular. This publication was a bimonthly journal and would be circulated nearly 
for fifteen years starting from 1968. There were important names who were the 
editors of the Chronicle in different periods. These names included intellectuals like 
Natalya Gorbanevskaya,267 Tatyana Velikhanova, Tatyana Khodorovich, Anatoly 
Yakobson and Sergey Kovalev.  
Compared to the coming decades, the relatively united characteristic of the 
dissidence movement found one of its best reflections in the Chronicle. The reason 
was the focus on the general aim in human rights and law. People from various 
intellectual backgrounds, including Marxist-Leninist, Christian nationalist, or liberal 
came together inside the Chronicle.268 Although, the priority in the writings was 
given to deteriorating situation for the individual dissidents, and their struggle 
against the regime, a concern to the continuing problems stemming from the failures 
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of the previous decades, e.g. the burdens on Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and 
other national and religious groups, was discernible in each issue of the Chronicle.269  
Other important examples to samizdat such as Synthax (published between 
1958-60, edited by Alexander Ginzburg), Phoenix270 (between 1961-66), Sphinxes 
(edited by Valerie Tarsis in 1965) were all regarded as the precursors of the 
Chronicle. However, the major difference between the first examples of the samizdat 
and the Chronicle was that whereas the Chronicle paid a special attention on 
reporting of the protest movements, previous examples had been dedicated merely to 
political-cultural essays and poetry. In an environment dominated by the regime’s 
repression, the emergence and the continuation of the Chronicle was explained 
clearly by various dissidents such as Grigorenko. He wrote in his Memoirs:  
The first bursts of publicity disclosed a whole mass of problems: legal, 
national, social, religious. Every day we learned of new persecutions, new 
arrests and new repressions. Somehow all of this had to be regularly reported 
to those interested in it, The Chronicle of Current Events was born. No one 
sat around planning ahead, working out programs, or determining the 
frequency of publication. It was requisite to take stock of and publicize the 
struggle that had unfolded after the appeal of Bogoraz and Litvinov. […] The 
appeal inspired new forces in samizdat, and samizdat ceased to be a purely 
literary matter. Open letters, essays, leaflets, treatises, research, and 
monographs began to be published.271 
 
The Chronicle had an informatory role with its different sections such as 
“News About Samizdat Works,” “Extra-Judicial Political Repressions,” “News in 
Brief,” “Brief Reports,” “Political Trials in Towns around the Country.” 
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Accordingly, the Chronicle had a role also in the communication between 
opposition-groups by informing them about both public protests and dissident 
intellectuals’ opinions.272 For that reason, “the most remarkable aspect of the 
Chronicle is the nationwide information network it created.”273  
In this network all readers were given a task, and it was mentioned clearly 
within the Chronicle: “Anybody who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is 
informed about what goes on in the country, may easily pass on information to the 
editors of Chronicle.”274 From this message, the special importance of the Chronicle 
for human rights activists could be grasped in a clear way: For a certain period of 
time, the journal turned to be an important source to express different opinions on the 
regime’s human rights violations. So, during the editorship of Sergey Kovalev, a 
biologist and a well-known human rights activist after 1969, the Chronicle expanded 
its agenda and intensified the protest against the regime while the KGB was 
continuing arrests of the intellectuals.275  
The Western world was also aware about the presence of the issues of the 
Chronicle that continued to be published and circulated despite the pressure from the 
government. This awareness could be possible with the writers such as Peter 
Reddaway who provided the first eleven issues of the Chronicle in his book 
Uncensored Russia. Also Amnesty International published complete English 
translations of the Chronicle starting from its issue dated Feb. 11, 1971.276 
Considering the main ideas that inspired the Chronicle, Reddaway underlines 
the usage of some universally-accepted principles of human rights starting from the 
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first issues of this publication.277 So, 1968 and its “designation” as a human rights 
year by the United Nations gave the Chronicle the first inspirations.278 When we look 
at the issues within 1968 all of them started with the motto of “Human Rights Year 
in the Soviet Union,” and in early 1970s, this sentence turns into “The Movement in 
Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union Continues.”279 Until the last 
publications, this motto was not removed from the introduction of the issues.  
Starting from the publication of the first issues, another important detail that 
could be seen in the introductory part of the Chronicle was the usage of the Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which says: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.280 
 
However, despite the continuing particular emphasis on internationally-recognized 
human rights, starting from 1972, the regime intensified its harsh measures against 
the opposition pioneered by the Chronicle. The activists were searched and arrested 
across the whole USSR. The period 1972-1974 was called as one of the most 
difficult moments for the human rights movement in the Soviet Union.281 In May 
1974, a press conference was held by the prominent intellectuals such as Andrei 
Sakharov, Sergey Kovalev, Tatyana Khodorovich and Tatyana Velikhanova.282 For 
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them, the publication of the Chronicle was not an illegal act, and its circulation 
should have continued. Just after this declaration, Kovalev was arrested and 
sentenced to seven years in a labor camp.283 In its pattern, the Soviet state was seen 
as the follower of the Leninist method of the “hostage taking,” because the regime 
had already declared that as a response to each issue of the Chronicle, people would 
be arrested.284 
 
4.3. Human Rights Organizations during 1970s 
In the second half of 1960s, following the re-Stalinization policies of Brezhnev 
administration and following the other significant events inside the Socialist Bloc, 
like the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the forces of Warsaw Pact in 1968, the 
dissidents were subjected to a new wave of oppression in Soviet Russia.285 For the 
human rights activism, this was the time in which cautious representatives of the 
intelligentsia, who were mainly from the academia, came to the front. To be cautious 
meant to stay within the limits set by the regime. Consequently this created a new 
dilemma among the dissidents regarding the position they had vis a vis the system in 
the Soviet Union.286 
At the same time the legal documents like the Soviet constitution served as a 
source of legitimization for the organizational unification of the dissidence in the 
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realm of human rights. That was the beginning of the appearance of professional 
groups who did not remain underground or illegal; but started to declare common 
grievances in the public. Thus, there was a new challenge against the traditional 
characteristic of the state authority and against its “absolute values” by using 
principles based on the legality of the system287 and on the international legal norms 
of human rights that were accepted by the Soviet regime.288 
Moreover, starting from the last years of 1960s, it was discernible that the 
failures of the first dissident initiatives on human rights did not prevent the 
establishment of organizations. Likewise, it should not be ignored that within the 
following decades, the first attempts in 1960s led by the samizdat networks paved the 
way for several other initiatives undertaken by dissidents. Thus, starting from the last 
years of 1960s (around the same dates of the beginning of the détente era in East-
West relations) several organizational acts were effective on the opposition based on 
human rights issues. 
 
4.3.1. First Group inside the Human Rights Movement:  The Initiative Group 
for Defense of Civil Rights 
The attempts to create an organizational unification in the human rights movement 
concluded with the emergence of the first human rights organization in the Soviet 
history. That was the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights (hereafter 
mentioned as the Initiative Group). It was founded in early 1969. The first aim 
during the foundation of the group was to support militant civil rights leader Petro 
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Grigorenko after his arrest. It is suggested that following the arrest of Grigorenko, a 
desire to coordinate members’ civil rights activities appeared as another important  
aim for the Initiative Group.289  
The Initiative Group had various types of members who had different 
backgrounds and different concerns. Among them Petro Grigorenko was 
characterized as a Leninist and was famous with his trials in the sixties. He was also 
concerned about the problems faced by the Crimean Tatars during the Soviet era. 
Another example of the members of the Initiative Group was Anatoly Levitin-
Krasnov, who was a devoted Orthodox believer and had spent seven years in Stalin’s 
labor camps. His primary concern was about religious freedoms. He thought that 
without civil rights and basic human rights, freedom of religion was impossible to 
achieve. Moreover, the activists, like Vladimir Spelak, stood against the anti-
Semitism in the Soviet society and appeared as the supporter of Jewish rights inside 
the group.290 
The Initiative Group defined itself in a samizdat article in the Chronicle as an 
organization, which did not have any particular program or charter. Consequently, its 
members were bound between each other with moral values, rather than with formal 
regulations. The reasons for their unification in one organization was “their [belief 
in] civil rights, devotion to freedom, and a feeling of responsibility for everything 
that takes place” in the Soviet Union.291  
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Furthermore, for Emma Gilligan the aim of the intellectuals in the post-
Khrushchev era, while taking part in the organizations such as in the Initiative 
Group, was more aesthetic and ethical rather than political. Thus “the ugliness of the 
Soviet regime” was the first thing that created a wider common response from the 
intelligentsia. Against this threatening ugliness, the integrity of the individual against 
the collectivism of the Soviet system turned out to be the main initial principle of 
several human rights activists.292 
  One of the main strategies of the Initiative Group was to intensify relations 
with the Western world and with the United Nations (UN). Therefore, they aimed to 
attract attention in the Western public opinion about the developments in the 
USSR.293 In this way they wanted to put pressure on their government. One of the 
appeals, circulated by the Group on May 20, 1969 included following words:  
We, the undersigned, deeply disturbed by the unceasing political repressions 
in the Soviet Union, and seeing in this a return to Stalinist times when our 
entire country found itself in the grip of terror, appeal to the Human Rights 
Commission of the United Nations to defend the human rights being trampled 
on in our country. 
We appeal to the UN because we have had no response to the protests and 
complaints that we have sent for quiet a number of years to the highest 
government and judicial offices of the Soviet Union. The hope that our voice 
might be heard, that the authorities would cease their illegal actions, which 
we repeatedly called attention to- this hope has died.294 
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However, as one of the failures of this first attempt, there was no serious response 
from any Western country or from the UN. The Western Bloc countries and the UN 
did not tend to have contact with the Soviet government regarding the issue of 
human rights. The unfamiliarity of such moral issues within the bilateral nature of 
foreign policy was one significant reason. Thus, at the time, in which this declaration 
was publicized, the rationalist and realist policy makers of Cold-War politics were 
not ready to include any domestic grievance in international politics.  
In addition, Petro adds some other domestic explanations for the 
insufficiencies of the first human rights movement in Soviet Russia. One of them 
was the apolitical nature of the program of the organization. It was too moderate 
towards the Soviet government and proposed no concrete plans for a long-term 
rehabilitation of the system. The problem was that the respect to the constitution had 
put some limits to the practical solutions proposed by the members of the 
organization. Moreover, the organization was too limited within its own membership 
and did not offer a platform, in which public participation could have been 
possible.295  
Initiative Group continued to operate with its core members who consisted of 
nearly fifteen people. By mid-1973, fourteen of these fifteen members were 
subjected to extra-judicial repression. Interrogation in KGB offices, sentences to 
camps, or commitment to special psychiatric hospitals were among the elements of 
the repression.296  
 
4.3.2. The Moscow Human Rights Committee 
The Moscow Human Rights Committee was known with its significant member,  
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physicist Andrei Sakharov.297 The Committee was founded in November 1970. 
Among the other founders of the Committee were the names, Valerie Chalidze and 
Andrei Tverdokhlebov who were also leading nuclear physicists like Sakharov.298 
This initiative was described as an attempt of a liberal or legalist movement which 
dedicated to defend basic human rights such as freedom of speech and information or 
rights of political minorities.299  
The Committee aimed to function completely according to the legal rights 
given by the Constitution and did not attempt to have a direct conflict with the 
official line of the government. Hence, as a legal and educational center, it started to 
be an important source to get information on the theoretical and also practical matters 
of human rights.300 From the Committee’s statement of purpose circulated at that 
time its aims could be understood more clearly: 
[C]onsultative assistance to the organs of government in the establishment 
and application of guarantees of Human Rights, carried out on the initiative of 
the Committee or of interested organs of government; 
[C]reative assistance to persons engaged in constructive research into the 
theoretical aspects of the Human Rights question and in the study of the 
specific nature of this question in a socialist society; 
[L]egal enlightenment, in particular the propaganda of international and 
Soviet legal documents on Human Rights.301 
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Compared to the Initiative Group’s activities between 1969-1971, the impact of the 
Moscow Human Rights Committee was more observable in the international scene. 
In 1971, the Committee achieved to establish links with the International League of 
the Rights of Man in New York and International Institute for Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.302  
Sakharov’s reputation and contacts in the Western world,303 and his winning 
of the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1975 played a significant role in the recognition 
of the Committee’s human rights movement by the West.304 As Alexeyeva claims, 
there was no leadership inside the human rights movement, and Sakharov could not 
have been called as the leader of this movement. However, his principles and 
activities based on the ideas like “self-sacrifice,” “a willingness to help persons– 
whether or not they hold the same convictions,” and a universal peace and 
reconciliation-aim between the rivals in the world politics are all seen as consistent 
with the “spirit” of the human rights doctrine and with the logic of the whole 
movement inside the Soviet Union.305  
However, about the general situation of the human rights movement, the 
period after 1972 was not showing any sign for hope against the state’s authority, and 
as Alexeyeva argues “[f]rom 1973 to 1974 both enemies and well-wishers spoke of 
the movement in the past tense.”306 In this context, regarding the pressure on the 
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Soviet government and the change in the governmental policies, Sakharov’s ideals 
and his Committee’s actions were described as insufficient.307 During the next years, 
Chalidze and Tverdokhlebov would withdraw from active participation to the 
Committee’s activities, and Sakharov would be the victim of his own active role in 
the human rights movement when he was sent to an internal exile to Gorky (Nizhny 
Novgorod) in 1980.308 
 
4.3.3. Helsinki Final Act and the Formation of the Helsinki Group 
 During the second half of 1970s, the dissidence entered into a new period of 
evolution. Obviously the policies of the Soviet administration played a role in this 
evolution. For instance, Brezhnev’s policies for arms race and indirect military 
involvements in the Third World have generated new arguments among the 
independent activists about the governance of the Soviet Union.309 In addition to 
such domestic issues, some other events at the international level contributed to the 
evolution of the dissidence. For example, Helsinki Final Act on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe310 in 1975, which was approved also by the Socialist Bloc 
countries, gave a new impetus to the groups and individuals who took part within the 
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opposition. In this environment Brezhnev was described as a participant of 
discussion in an international debate over human rights.311  
It was obvious that the negotiations between thirty-five countries, all the 
European states, United States and USSR, before the approval of Helsinki Accords 
prepared an environment in which the issue of human rights could be discussed 
freely. For Tismaneanu, “by signing this Act and publicizing it through the official 
media, Communist leaders unwillingly raised the threshold of expectation among 
their subjects.”312 Thus, continuing human rights violations contrary to the positive 
messages in the international environment, prepared an appropriate platform for 
opposition in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. 
Under the effect of this environment, an important step of the dissidence in 
Soviet Russia through the human rights activism was the establishment of the Public 
Group to Assist in the Observance of the Helsinki Accords or Moscow Helsinki 
Group (hereafter mentioned as “the Group” or “the Helsinki Group”). It is said that 
the name of the Group was “selected carefully” with a “desire to cooperate with the 
authorities,” and with “a positive and conscientious attitude toward the Soviet 
Union’s human rights obligations.”313  
One of the important results of the formation of the Helsinki Group in 
Moscow was its impact on the establishment of similar organizations in other 
national republics of the USSR. Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia were some 
of the countries in which these organizations began to be effective. Under the 
umbrella of human rights, different ideas and aims were being defended. For 
instance, in Ukraine, nationalism was within the agenda of the organization whereas 
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for Armenian monitoring organization the crucial problem was the union of a part of 
Azerbaijan with Armenian territory.314 
 The Moscow Helsinki Group’s founder and first chairman was Yuri 
Fyodorovich Orlov, another leading physicist and a member of Armenian Academy 
of Sciences.315 Some of the veteran dissidents like Alexander Ginzburg, Petro 
Grigorenko, Anatoly Marchenko, Sakharov’s wife Elena Bonner, Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva, Mikhail Bernshtam, Alexander Korchak, and Anatoly Shcharansky316 
were spelled among the members of the Group.317  
Similar to the contribution of the Chronicle, the formation of the Helsinki 
Group, first in Moscow, then in several other parts of the Soviet Union had a 
substantial role in the cohesion of the dissident movement. The Groups might be 
characterized as an amalgamation of different intellectuals with a common aim 
defined as human rights and as authorities’ compliance with international norms and 
principles. This commonality was essential to grasp the cohesion.318  
For the methods adopted in principle, Orlov mentions: 
[The Group] will accept directly from Soviet citizens written complaints that 
concern them personally and relate to violation of the articles mentioned 
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above [as the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe], and will forward such complaints in 
condensed form to all Heads of States signatory to the Final Act, as well as to 
the public. The Group will retain the original complaint signed by the 
author.319 
 
In such a way, by preparing the documents of the open appeals to the Western 
leaders to raise the attention in the international public opinion, the Group followed a 
method similar to the Moscow Human Rights Committee. However, an important 
difference occurred in the understanding of the Moscow Helsinki Group: Unlike the 
members of the Moscow Human Rights Committee, they did not believe in a mere 
struggle for persuading the Soviet government of the necessity of reforms.320 
Accordingly, Grigorenko: 
The USSR pays no heed to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights but 
continues to declare that all of the rights of man are well observed within its 
borders. And the West has begun to get accustomated to this lie and to 
indulge it. […] The Helsinki Groups have attacked the Soviet structure of 
lies; and the authorities have attempted to silence them.321 
 
As a consequence, the activities centered on the Helsinki Group gained more strength 
due to the international environment and increasing Western support to the 
humanitarian issues within the post-Helsinki era. Orlov, at this time, was defined as 
skillful in seeing the “opportunity to use the Final Act” to have more intense 
relations with the West.322 For instance, as a sign of increasing Western interest, in 
the United States a Helsinki Commission was established after the Conference, and 
when its delegates visited Moscow, they met Orlov and Turchin to take their views 
for the coming processes. 323    
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In fact, the Belgrade Conference in 1977, as the continuation of the Helsinki-
process between the signatory sides, proved that Western states were continuing to 
oppose Soviet regime because of its failure in recognizing and implementing 
humanitarian clauses of the Final Act. In this context, the effect of the Helsinki 
Groups in the Soviet Union had an undeniable impact in publicizing the internal 
violations inside the country. However, there are two sides, one positive the other 
negative, which must be taken seriously. Alexeyeva summarizes them: 
[i]t appeared that the goal of the Helsinki groups had been reached: the free 
world learned about demands that Soviet citizens had made of their 
government and openly supported those demands, but the anticipated result – 
a lessening of repression within the USSR – was not forthcoming. The arrests 
and harsh sentences of members of the Helsinki groups, during and after the 
Belgrade Conference, confirmed this bitter lesson.324 
  
Thus, in the following periods, Moscow Helsinki Group was to become another 
victim of the regime’s severe repressions.325 The suppression, crackdown and 
dissolution of Helsinki Groups in Moscow and in the other parts of the Soviet Union 
continued step by step until 1982.326 The leading members, Yuri Orlov received a 
punishment of seven years in the labor camp and five years in exile; Alexander 
Ginzburg, eight years in the labor camp and five years in exile, Shcharansky, thirteen 
years in prison and in labor camp.327 
 
4.4. Conclusion  
As this chapter shows, in the context of the Soviet social and political life, the  
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understanding of human rights could be seen directly connected with the concept of 
dissent and dissidence movements against the central rule that has been described as 
arbitrary and authoritarian for most of the time. 
Boobbyer argues that in terms of the moral philosophy of the dissidence 
against the Soviet rule, there was a “belief” in human rights and civil society.328 He 
finds a supporting detail about this argument in the usage of the term “conscience” in 
some of the writings and sayings of the opponent personalities. For instance, a 
prominent dissident, Anatoly Marchenko, used the terms, “civic conscience” and 
“public conscience,” in the open letters he wrote in 1968.329 Hence, starting from the 
defense of some basic civil and political rights, like freedom of speech, thought and 
“conscience,” the movement, based on the universal principles of human rights in 
Soviet Russia, can be evaluated in connection with the attempts to create a wider 
civil realm outside state’s measures and its dominance.330 
Within this framework, if the external developments are taken into 
consideration, as some prominent dissidents claim, “détente can only be assured if 
from the very outset it goes hand in hand with continuous openness on the part of all 
countries for civic and political rights.”331 Related to this idea, “human-right issue, 
therefore, is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of 
international trust and security.”332 
 Thus, the increasing prominence of human rights during the era of détente 
was consolidated with the logic of connectedness between rights and security. This 
connectedness made the Helsinki Process and its Final Act a significant development 
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and gave new hopes to defenders of human rights in Soviet Russia (in fact, to 
activists in many parts of the Soviet Union, and in the rest of the Socialist Bloc.  
On the other hand, the developments, like the Helsinki Conference, can be 
seen also as a success for the Soviet Union. The main reason behind the argument 
was that particularly within the short term, “everything remained precisely as it had 
been before Helsinki.”333 The sovereignty of the Soviet rule over Eastern and Central 
Europe remained undivided and Soviet authorities had one more chance to legitimize 
their acquisitions after the World War. Moreover, although Soviet authorities 
promised to respect human rights, the relatively positive atmosphere between states 
during and after the Helsinki process gave a new stimulation to suppress the 
opposition in the internal affairs after 1975. Human rights activists were those who 
were the victims of the continuing suppression despite the presence of the 
internationally-recognized norms and principles.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS VERSUS THE SOVIET STATE 
 
 
 
 
For the foreseeable future only the state can guarantee 
human rights; yet the state is also the principal apparatus 
of oppression in every society.334 
 
The human rights dissidence had a diverse range of supporters inside the Soviet 
Union. Although quantitatively the number of these supporters was not many, 
considering the qualitative effect, the movement can be regarded as a considerable 
source of opposition. On the other hand, as this thesis aimed to demonstrate, some 
explanations must be taken into consideration in order to understand the failure of the 
human rights movement in its first phase within the era of détente in the Soviet 
Union, and in order to comprehend the pre-eminence of rationalism, statism, and 
realism over normative and legalistic answers. 
 
5.1. Looking from the Angle of the Human Rights Activists 
From the angle of the dissidence, by the end of 1970s the limitations and weaknesses 
inherent in the human rights movement became obvious to understand the failures of 
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this movement throughout the era of détente.335 The first reason behind the weakness 
was explained as the lack of grassroots support to the human rights movement. There 
was a lack of communication between the leaders and the rest of the Soviet society. 
Although the dissident leaders enjoyed respect from the people, in the eyes of this 
small group of leaders, who were mainly academicians, society was still politically 
unaware and premature for a collective project such as human rights.  
Hence, the second reason was the inexperience and insufficiency of the 
leading members of the human rights movement for creating an effective 
organizational structure. That was the major reason behind the rapid disintegration of 
such organizations.  
The third reason of weakness was the overt pro-Western stance of human 
rights dissidence. In some instances, this attitude was to be used by the other groups, 
whose ideologies were based on the principles of nationalism, traditionalism or 
Russian Orthodoxy, against human rights activists in calling them as traitors. 
Furthermore, as a visible factor, the dependence on Western support was alienating 
others; thus, it put an obstacle to a possible complete-alliance between different sides 
of the dissidence-movement against the regime.336  
In fact, by relying on Western support human rights defenders adopted a 
considerable strategy. Following the Helsinki Process, this strategy began to show its 
effects. However, different from a period in which reformist or democratic claims 
can be put on practice with a wider social contribution, as in the era of Glasnost-
Perestroika,337 the effects were not to be enough to make radical changes within the 
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system during the era of détente. As Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki 
Group, mentions: 
So far as détente was concerned, that was precisely what the West was 
prepared to sacrifice human rights in the USSR for. […] Meanwhile, the 
dissidents had not only no opportunity to protest against the Soviet 
government’s reckless subversion of détente, but even no chance to get the 
information necessary for protest. All the democratic dissidents understood 
that only democratization of the USSR – including freedom of information 
and protest, as well as open borders – could ensure mutual security. However 
few people in the West understood this; even fewer believed that 
democratization in the USSR was possible.338 
 
Thus, from the side of the Western states the grand norm appeared as “the right to 
survival superseded any other”339 principle. Throughout the era of détente there were 
new inclinations in favor of human rights as seen from U.S. President Carter’s 
idealist policies, or from the beginning of the Helsinki process. However, this did not 
change the idea that for the major states, who might be the potential victims of a 
possible nuclear war; the violation of the norm of non-interference was seen as a 
more dangerous step than the violation of the international norms of human rights. 
As a fourth weakness or limitation within the human rights movement, during 
the late 1960s and the entire 1970s, there was no clearly defined objective. That was 
because the concept of human rights, as it was defined by the movement, did not 
offer any practical solutions to the existing problems of the society. It did not 
propose any alternative system, but continued the opposition within the borders set 
by the existing regime. This failure was the reason for the divergence between the 
human rights movement and other types of dissidence movements.340  
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As a fifth issue, the divergence was also existent among the human rights 
activists themselves. For Sergey Kovalev, in fact, the human rights movements had a 
division into two major groups: “Legalists” (zakonniki) and “politicals” (politiki).341  
The main aim of the legalists was defined as the protection of the individual and the 
integrity of man against the arbitrary rules and repression. The important 
characteristic of legalists was that they were not against the regime, and respected the 
constitution and the legal system.342 As in the case of the Moscow Human Rights 
Committee of Sakharov and Chalidze, they wanted to protect everyone without 
considering political ideas. In contrast with these legalist aims, politicals considered 
the very political regime of the Soviet Union one of the most serious problems. 
Hence, as in the case of the nationalist or democratic socialist agendas, to change the 
regime was an important aim for politicals.343  
It is true that the political or non-political character of the human-rights 
movement in the Soviet Union has been a subject of long discussions. Although there 
were arguments which marked the ineffectiveness of the human rights activists due 
to their non-political aims, there were some others which emphasized that actually 
human rights movement, as a whole, has been political in its core so that it could 
threaten the foundation of the Soviet power.344 According to such a view, the 
activists with their diverse motives under the umbrella of the human rights 
movement had considerable political views; but their emphasis was on the 
implementation of the norms of human rights rather than on the specific political 
aims.  
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Thus, conclusion of a common political programme was perceived by the 
activists, particularly by the legalist side of the human rights movement, as an 
impossible or a very difficult task. This perception paved the way for the non-
political nature of the human rights movement against the Soviet rule.345 However, 
even legalists, who saw no problem in their conciliatory and non-political attitude 
toward the state,346 had to face the result that the attempts of dialogue with the Soviet 
authorities were, in fact, fruitless until the beginning of Gorbachev period.347 
 
5.2. Looking from the Angle of the State 
A rationalist and statist approach is important to comprehend the Soviet domestic 
politics and the international political path of the era of détente. In this context, 
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Risse-Kappen summarizes the main framework of a statist approach related to the 
domestic policy choices within states: 
[T]he domestic power of states over society stemmed largely from the need to 
preserve the survival of the nation in an anarchical international system. They 
[Statists] emphasised the coercive rather than the distributive role of the state 
in its relation to society. The emergence of modern nation-states was not so 
much the result of original social contracts but of internal coercion and 
extraction of resources as well as external war-fighting against rivals. 
“Statists” also maintained that state actors have considerably more leeway 
from societal constraints in the foreign policy arena than in other issue-
areas.348 
 
Thus, considering the information given on political realism and the anarchical world 
structure against human rights, the conceptualization through the lenses of a “statist” 
approach is, in fact, consistent with traditional realist perspectives due to the fact that 
“[s]tatism, realism, and neorealism are all manifestations of a power politics 
paradigm which is actor oriented and which sees politics as a struggle over valued 
resources.”349  
In a statist line, both “internal and external challenges” are taken seriously to 
preserve the power and the state as a unitary actor.350 Accordingly, slightly different 
from the realist premises, domestic balances and challenges will be given a higher 
status while the policy makers’ decisions based on national interest are supported by 
an extra protection from “resistance.”351 The decision makers as actors who possess 
particular preferences become a part of the rational side of statist and realist claims. 
Similar to Krasner’s assumption, we can say that “rulers want to stay in power and, 
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being in power, they want to promote the security, prosperity and values of their 
constituents,” while it has been discernible that “the way in which they accomplish  
these objectives will vary from one state to another.”352 
Accordingly, a study on Soviet system can show that the response from the 
regime to the dissidents should be also understood within the context of foreign 
policy events. Thus, in an era of détente through which the Communist governments 
wanted to eradicate the past disadvantages and desired to come to a favorable 
position compared to their Western rivals, any oppositional activities designed for a 
critique of the whole system must be repressed severely so that both internal and 
external balances could be kept within the same line of interests.353  
On the other hand, ideology served obviously to the rational side of Soviet 
argumentation. Thus, the Soviet state always distanced itself from the approval of 
Western individualism and classical human rights doctrines. This is why for the 
Soviet state, freedom of expression and conscience could never be thought as 
absolute rights, particularly if they were taken together with the deteriorative effects 
against the public order and political regime.354  
The traditional opposition from the official regime took a shape during 1970s, 
and there was a new period of repression of dissidents who were accused of being 
“re-educated” according to the principles of Western individualism and of initiating 
anarchy against the Soviet socialist order.355 In fact, Soviet socialist point of view 
was congruent with the argument that in the history of the development of the 
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concept of human rights, “the West is seeking a propaganda effect and an 
opportunity to interfere in internal affairs of states.”356 For instance, while the 
Helsinki Process was continuing, Brezhnev declared:  
In the recent period some Western circles have been, in effect, trying to 
circumvent these principles [of non-interference in the internal affairs and of 
peaceful coexistence] by proposing something like a new edition of the cold 
or, if you prefer psychological war. I am referring to the campaign conducted 
under the hypocritical slogan of “defending human rights” in the socialist 
countries.357 
 
In the post-Helsinki Process this attitude continued in the name of the internal 
stability of the state and society. Regarding the Soviet state’s response to the 
dissidence of the Helsinki Groups following the Helsinki Accords, Parchomenko 
analyzed the situation from the point of the ideological and psychological elements 
of policy making. He says: 
Influenced by the extreme and stereotypic conceptions of dissidents and of 
Western psychological warfare that pervade official pronouncements, as well 
as by the very real contacts between dissidents and foreigners, Soviet 
authorities viewed the activities of Orlov and his associates as an organic 
element of a carefully calculated and foreign-inspired campaign to undermine 
the prestige and security of the Soviet Union.358  
 
The ideological rivalry with the West and the struggle to preserve the survival of the 
state in the international area led authorities to find new ways to ensure the stability 
by silencing opponent voices. For Alexeyeva, for instance, the employment of direct 
“political repression” was seen as “harmful to the Soviet Union’s reputation” at that 
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period. So, the Soviet bureaucracy “sought a way out by declaring mentally unsound 
those human rights activists they were unable to put on trial for fear of scandal.”359  
 Thus, as seen from the emergence of various methods of repression in the 
Soviet Union, the understanding in a legal/governmental system that is based on a 
pure aim of the “interests of the state” and on the idea of the holiness of the 
established order can be the beginning of several other problems related to the issue 
of human rights. Accordingly, as Chalidze, a well-known dissident, claims “the 
principle that for the sake of the interests of the state one should make any sacrifice, 
a fortiori sacrifices associated with the interests of the individual” lead to various 
crimes and violations; and usually according to the legal system that is created by the 
state itself, “such acts are not crimes” as in the Soviet case.360  
 
5.3. Overall Evaluation  
In an overall evaluation, in this work’s theoretical study throughout the second 
chapter, rational decision-making, state’s survival and interests in an ungoverned/ 
anarchic environment are considered to understand the inadequacy of the 
constructivist/ideational perspective on the internalization of the domestic issue of 
human rights. In this regard, the third chapter offered us an account of the era of 
détente during which the enmities via the ideological and material rivalry between 
the states continued despite the presence of the attempts to consolidate the normative 
structure of international politics, as in the Helsinki Process. The fourth chapter 
combines the perspective on international politics with a domestic account on the 
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 Alexeyeva, p. 310.  
360
 Chalidze, p. 15. Particularly, in the Soviet case, the famous articles 70 (on “Anti-Soviet agitation or 
propaganda”) and Article 190-191 (on “Spreading of deliberate fabrications, verbal or otherwise, 
slandering the Soviet political and social system”) are regarded as “little different,” and at the hands of 
the state, they are seen as an “easy” way “to convict dissidents.” See, Rubenstein, p. 45.  
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dissidence activities in Soviet Russia during the era of détente. It has been seen that 
the international norms and principles of human rights provided a considerable 
inspiration to various kinds of opposition-movements. However, despite its positive 
stance on the recognition of those norms in the international sphere, the Soviet state 
did not abandon the repressive methods inside the country. 
Thus, by emphasizing the clash between the Soviet state and the Soviet 
(Russian) dissidents during the era of détente, this thesis concludes that a normative 
approach based on the principled ideas of human rights can not explain Soviet state’s 
response to the human rights-based dissidence in its domestic affairs, although those 
principled ideas have turned out to be the binding norms for states through 
international agreements and international law. Therefore, rationality of the decision 
makers congruent with the pre-eminence of statism in the domestic affairs and with 
the supremacy of political realism in the international realm has been taken as the 
main feature of the explanatory theoretical framework. 
Within this context, the major contribution of this thesis lies in the very 
methodology of its structure. A theoretical base on human rights literature is tried to 
be employed for the explanation of a rather descriptive account of the Soviet human 
rights groups during the era of détente. It is believed that both the descriptive part 
and the theoretical parts might provide a new base for a further analytical approach 
to the topic, geography, and the groups under consideration.  
The results derived from this work can be benefited generally to evaluate the 
states’ attitude to the normative rules and principles, such as human rights, within the 
domestic and international realms. Particularly, taking this work into consideration, 
the Soviet Union during the next decades of the Cold-War and post-Soviet Russian 
Federation can be the subjects of a further study. In this regard, it should be said that 
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the ideas of the representatives of the human rights movement in the era of détente 
were carried to the period of Gorbachev. These ideas had a considerable role within 
the informal opposition activities against the Gorbachev regime. In the current 
history of the post-Soviet Russian Federation, although the state preserves its power 
and dominance, the legacy of the human rights tradition initiated in the Soviet Union 
is a discernible reality. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - 1948361 
 
On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and 
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears 
in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all 
Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be 
disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other 
educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or 
territories." 
PREAMBLE 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world,  
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,  
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by 
the rule of law,  
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between 
nations,  
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the 
equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom,  
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms,  
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
                                                 
361
 See, the website of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
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Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction. 
 
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. 
 
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. 
 
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 
Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade 
shall be prohibited in all their forms. 
 
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
 
Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law. 
 
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination. 
 
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law. 
 
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charge against him. 
 
Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all 
the guarantees necessary for his defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal 
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offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed. 
 
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own, and to return to his country. 
 
Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. 
 
Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled 
to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall 
be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State. 
 
Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal 
access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
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Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality. 
 
Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) 
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) 
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
 
Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation 
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
 
Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to 
special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection. 
 
Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher 
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further 
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a 
prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
 
Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
 
Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
 
Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no 
case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
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Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
“Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States” 
from 
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki Declaration – 1975) 362 
 
The participating States,  
Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing 
development of friendly relations and co-operation;  
Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of 
peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, 
heightened by experience of the past;  
Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and 
active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and 
effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in 
promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of 
friendly relations and cooperation among States;  
Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and 
are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will 
to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations;  
Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its 
relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or 
social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic 
development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding 
their mutual relations:  
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty  
The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality 
as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in 
particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to 
freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to 
choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its 
right to determine its laws and regulations.  
                                                 
362
 For the whole document, see, the website of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf 
 109 
Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal 
rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it 
wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the 
spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in 
accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also 
have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to 
be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a 
party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.  
II. Refraining from the threat or use of force  
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No 
consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in 
contravention of this principle.  
Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of 
force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State.  
Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing 
another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. 
Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by 
force.  
No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or 
questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.  
III. Inviolability of frontiers  
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the 
frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future 
from assaulting these frontiers.  
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and 
usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.  
IV. Territorial integrity of States  
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating 
States.  
Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political 
independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such 
action constituting a threat or use of force.  
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the 
object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in 
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contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such 
measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized 
as legal.  
V. Peaceful settlement of disputes  
The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a 
manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.  
They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and 
equitable solution on the basis of international law.  
For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own 
choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which 
they are parties.  
In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the 
parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute 
peacefully.  
Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating 
States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a 
degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby 
make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.  
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs  
The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, 
individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.  
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such 
intervention against another participating State.  
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of 
political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the 
exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus 
to secure advantages of any kind.  
Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist 
activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of 
the regime of another participating State.  
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion or belief  
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.  
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They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.  
Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom 
of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion 
or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.  
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the 
right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford 
them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.  
The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice 
and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-
operation among themselves as among all States.  
They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and 
will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United 
Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.  
They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in 
this field.  
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act 
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their 
obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, 
including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may 
be bound.  
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples  
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-
determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, 
including those relating to territorial integrity of States.  
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their 
internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as 
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.  
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective 
exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of 
friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the 
importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.  
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IX. Cooperation among States  
The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all 
States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. In developing their co-operation the participating States will place 
special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in 
conditions of full equality.  
They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual 
understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among 
themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in 
developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to 
the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from 
increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, 
scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps 
to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will 
take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of 
economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries 
throughout the world.  
They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant 
and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their 
cooperation.  
They will strive, in increasing their cooperation as set forth above, to develop closer 
relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of 
peoples.  
X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law  
The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international 
law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules 
of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in 
conformity with international law, to which they are parties.  
In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and 
regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; 
they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.  
The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and 
their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations 
under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they 
will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into 
account the others.  
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The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these 
principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual 
relations and cooperation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits 
resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.  
The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, 
to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations 
under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights 
and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and 
arrangements.  
The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will 
encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-
operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for 
these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them 
which in time would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and 
views.  
The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other 
States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
The Normative and Social Structure of Human Rights363 
 
 
State Community/organization 
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                      Action                    ↓          Omission (negative rights) 
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Individuals 
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                                 Legitimacy                          Accountability  
State 
Rights   Duties 
 Individuals 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
363
 See, Johan Galtung, “The Universality of Human Rights Revisited: Some Less Applaudable Consequences of 
the Human Rights Tradition,” in Human Rights in Perspective: A Global Assessment, Asbjørn Eide and Bernt 
Hagtvet (eds.) (Oxford, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p. 154. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
A Sample Front Page from Chronicle of Current Events  
in its English Translation364 
 
 
The Movement in Defence of Human Rights in the  
Soviet Union 
Continues 
 
A Chronicle of Current Events 
 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, 
receive, and impart information and 
ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”  
  Universal Declaration   
                          of Human Rights,    
                          Article 19 
 
 
 
  Issue No.17     31 December 1970 
        (Moscow) 
 
 
Third Year of Publication 
 
CONTENTS 
 
The Trial of Amalrik and Ubuzhko. Andrei Amalrik’s final address. The trial 
of Valentin Moroz. Solzhenitsyn’s letter to the Nobel Foundation. The 
Committee for Human Rights in the USSR. Public statements regarding the 
trial of Pimenov, Vail and Zinoveva. The Leningrad trial of the “hi-jackers”. 
Trial of recent years: the case of the UNF [Ukrainian National Front]. 
Persecution of Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel. Rigerman, American 
citizenship and the Soviet police. The fate of Fritz Mender. Political prisoners 
in the Mordovian camps. News in brief. Samizdat news. [Index.] 
 
                                                 
364
 From Chronicle of Current Events, Issue 17 (London: Essex University Library Collection). 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Photographs of Some Leading Human Rights Defenders/Dissidents in  
Soviet Russia365 
 
 
                                     
      Members of the Initiative Group for Defense of Civil (Human) Rights:                        Andrei Sakharov   
                      (From Left to Right) Sergey Kovalev, Tatyana Khodorovich,  
                      Tatyana Velikhanova, Grigory Podyapolsky, Anatoly Levitin-Krasnov 
 
 
                                        
Andrei Sinyavsky                                                      Valery Chalidze           Yuri Orlov 
 
                                       
 Natalya Gorbanevskaya      Larisa Bogoraz    Ludmilla Alexeyeva 
 
 
                                                 
365
 For the photographs, see websites, like http://www.gulaghistory.org, http://americanradioworks. 
publicradio.org; http://www.russiaprofile.org; http://www.peoples.ru; http://www.britannica.com; 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Andrei Sakharov’s Letter to Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter During the 
Presidential Campaign - 1976366 
 
 
 
At this time when, as part of the election campaign, candidates for the post of 
President of the US are preparing and presenting  the principles of their future policies 
to the American people, I think it important to state publicity once again certain 
propositions that, in my opinion, have fundamental significance.  
 
I am convinced that political and civil liberties all over the world, freedom of belief 
and freedom of worship, freedom of information, freedom of movement, and freedom 
to choose one's country of residence are inseparable from the main tasks facing 
mankind, i.e. ensuring international security, economic and social progress, and 
protection of the environment.  
 
I am convinced that isolationism and national egotism are incompatible with defense 
of human rights. An ever increasing recognition of these principles is reflected in the 
Helsinki agreement and opens new opportunities for international initiatives, such as, 
for example, the struggle for a general worldwide amnesty of political prisoners.  
 
You know that at present there are thousands of prisoners of conscience in our country 
and in other countries of Eastern Europe, in China, in many countries of the "Third 
World" and in the West. Convicted for their participation in the exchange of their 
opinions, information, for religious activities, or for attempts to leave country, they are 
kept in jails, labor camps, and special psychiatric hospitals, where they suffer from 
hunger, cold, back-breaking labor, punishments and humiliations unworthy of the 
civilized world.  
 
I urge you to keep up your efforts in the struggle for freedom to choose one's country 
of residence. I emphasize again the extreme importance of the free movement of 
information and people on an international scale, including free broadcasting.  
 
I hope that the idea of an active struggle for universal human rights will play an 
increasing role in politics, in the spirit of the freedom-loving and humanitarian 
traditions of the American people.  
 
With profound respect and hope, 
 
Andrei SAKHAROV,  
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate. 
 
 
                                                 
366
 See, “KGB File of Andrei Sakharov,” Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (eds.), in Annals of 
Communism of Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_117.htm 
(last accessed on July 10, 2008).  
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
U.S. President Carter’s Letter to Andrei Sakharov - 1977367 
 
 
 
 
Dear Professor Sakharov,  
 
I received your letter of January 21, and I want to express my appreciation to 
you for bringing your thoughts to my personal attention. 
 
Human rights is a central concern of my administration. In my inaugural 
address I stated: “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of 
freedom elsewhere.” You may rest assured that the American people and our 
government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights 
not only in our country but also abroad. 
 
We shall use our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience, 
and we will continue our efforts to shape a world responsive to human aspirations in 
which nations of differing cultures and histories can live side by side in peace and 
justice. 
 
I am always glad to hear from you, and I wish you well.    
 
Sincerely,   
 
Jimmy Carter 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
367
 For the document, see, Andrei Sakharov, Alarm and Hope (London: Colins and Harvel, 1979), p. 50.  
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APPENDIX H 
 
Andropov to the Central Committee: The Human Rights Committee Begins Its Work – 
December 4, 1970 (Russian and English) 368 
 
 
                                                 
368
 See, “KGB File of Andrei Sakharov,” Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (eds.), in Annals of 
Communism of Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_017.htm 
(last accessed on July 10, 2008). 
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Translation into English (Appendix H) 
 
THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF 
CPSU 
4140 
DECEMBER 7, 1970 
1ST SECTION 
TO BE RETURNED 
TO THE GENERAL 
DEPARTMENT 
OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE 
OF CPSU 
 
 
SPECIAL FOLDER 
DECLASSIFIED 
Top Secret          
Of special importance 
 
December 4, 1970 
#3300-A/ov 
MOSCOW 
 
 
 
 To pass around 
 
 I request to have it  discussed in the Politburo 
 Andropov 
 TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CPSU 
 
The Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR reported, in 
its 3163-Ts/OV dated November 18, 1970, that Academician Sakharov , CHALIDZE 
and TVERDOKHLEBOV had organized a so-called "Human Rights Committee." 
 
They have prepared the "Principles of the Human Rights Committee” and "Rules and 
Procedures of the ”Human Rights Committee,” which they intend to circulate to 
various public organizations in the USSR and abroad in order to "establish working 
relations and exchange information and publications." 
 
Both documents have been sent to the UN Association of the USSR (copies are 
enclosed). Sakharov extols, among his followers, the creation of the "Committee" and 
explains that its exclusive goal is  allegedly "studying the problem of human rights in 
the USSR". At the same time, he considers it possible to protest, as a private person, 
the conviction of particular citizens on charges of anti-Soviet activity (PIMENOV, 
AMALRIK, and others). 
 
Also, information has been received that the Committee’s organizers have enlisted 
VOLPIN-ESENIN, a junior scientist at the All-Union Institute of Scientific and 
Technical Information, and TSUKERMAN, a scientist at the Institute of Chemical 
Reagents, as the "Committee experts." 
 
The Committee for State Security is taking measures to determine the practical role of 
each member of the "Committee" and to contain their politically harmful actions. 
 
   CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY 
   OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR - ANDROPOV 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Andropov to the Central Committee: Establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Watch 
Group – November 15, 1976 (Russian and English) 369 
 
 
                                                 
369
 See, “KGB File of Andrei Sakharov,” Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (eds.), in Annals of 
Communism of Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_017.htm 
(last accessed on July 10, 2008). 
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Translation into English (Appendix I) 
 
 
To:CC CPSU 
USSR Committee for State Security 
At the USSR Council of Ministers  
15 November 1976 
No. 2577-A 
Moscow 
 
About the Hostile Actions of the so-called 
Group for Assistance of Implementation  
of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR  
 
In recent years, the intelligence services and propaganda organs of the enemy have 
attempted to create the apparition of a so-called "domestic opposition" in the Soviet 
Union. They are taking measures to support the instigators of antisocial manifestations 
and objectively to assist the participants in various currents of anti-Soviet activities to 
form a bloc. 
 
Thus, in 1969, antisocial elements led by IAKIR and KRASIN founded an "Initiative 
Group" for the purposes of creating an organized association of those who participate 
in the so-called "democratization movement." 
 
In 1970, to stimulate the antisocial activities of hostile elements, CHALIDZE created 
the so-called "Human Rights Committee," which was joined by academician 
SAKHAROV and a corresponding-member of the Academy of Sciences, 
SHAFAREVICH. 
 
In 1973, the so-called "Russian" section of "Amnesty International," headed by 
TURCHIN and TVERDOKHLEBOV, assumed the function of providing an organized 
association of anti-Soviet individuals. 
 
The members of these organizations established contacts with certain foreign anti-
Soviet centers and, for purposes of discrediting the Soviet state and public order, 
collected and assembled libelous materials. 
 
As a result of measures taken by the Committee for State Security, the "Initiative 
Group" and the "Human Rights Committee" compromised themselves totally and, for 
all practical purposes, ceased to exist. The activity of the "Russian Section" was 
contained. 
 
However, despite all the failures to create a "domestic opposition" in the USSR, the 
enemy has not abandoned this idea. 
 
On 12 May 1976, at the initiative of  Iu.F. ORLOV (corresponding member of the 
Armenian Academy of Sciences; born 1924; unemployed), antisocial elements 
announced the creation of a "group to help implement the Helsinki Agreements in the 
USSR." 
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The "group" includes the following individuals: Those who have repeatedly been 
subjected to criminal prosecution—A.I. GINZBURG (born in 1936; Jew; 
unemployed) and P.  G. GRIGORENKO (born in 1907; Ukrainian; pensioner); the 
professional criminal A.T.  MARCHENKO (born in 1938; Russian; serving a sentence 
of exile in Irkutsk Oblast); Jewish extremists—V.A. RUBIN (born in 1923; Jew; 
emigrated to Israel); A.D. SHCHARANSKII [Sharansky] (born in 1948; Jew; 
unemployed), and V.S. SLEPAK (born in 1927; Jew; unemployed); participants in 
various hostile activities—the wife of SAKHAROV, E.G. BONNER (born in 1922; 
Jew; pensioner); M.S. BERNSHTAM (born in 1949; Jew; emigrated to Israel); M.N. 
LANDA (born in 1918; Jew; pensioner); L.M. ALEXEEVA (born in 1927; Russian; 
unemployed), and A.A. KORCHAK (born in 1922; Ukrainian; researcher at the 
Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Ionosphere and Radiowave Distribution at the 
USSR Academy of Sciences). 
 
In creating this "Group," these people pursue the provocative goal of questioning the 
sincerity of attempts by the USSR to implement the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and thereby to put pressure on the government of 
the Soviet Union in questions pertaining to the realization of the Helsinki agreements 
(above all, in the "third basket"). 
 
The members of the "Group" are collecting information about alleged instances where 
the Soviet government has failed to implement the Final Act, in particular, through 
"violations of the fundamental rights of Soviet citizens," "persecution of dissent," etc. 
 
They transmit the information collected on this question, through various channels, to 
the governments of countries that signed the Final Act.  According to the conception 
of the "Group's" members, under special circumstances they will appeal to these 
countries to create an international commission to investigate the facts of a case. 
Moreover, the "group" is counting on Western public opinion to put pressure on the 
Soviet government and will not seek, in the words of ORLOV, "to find support among 
the [Soviet] people." 
 
Antisocial elements appeal to the heads of states that participated in the Helsinki 
conference to establish similar unofficial control groups in their own countries. The 
latter can then all be united in an international committee. 
 
During the period of its existence, the "group" has undertaken a number of attempts to 
obtain official recognition by governmental agencies in the USA. Thus, ORLOV held 
a conversation with the first secretary of the political section of the U.S. embassy in 
Moscow, RICHARD COMBS in September 1976. ORLOV insisted that the U.S. 
Department of State grant official recognition to the "group," and that the Americans 
use the information from the "group" at the level of governments and heads of state (at 
the impending conference in Belgrade as well). 
 
The Committee for State Security is taking measures to compromise and interdict 
hostile activities by the participants of the "group."  
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